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HE (D) reorganization takes its popular name from the subparagraph
designation in section 368(a) (1) (D) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. The six subparagraphs of section 368(a) (1) are divided into two gen-
eral categories. (A) through (C) are known as amalgamating reorganizations,
combining at least two corporations. (D) through (F) are generally referred
to as divisive reorganizations, in that a corporation is split into or divided
among two or more corporations, either new or existing. Although the defi-
nition of each type of reorganization appears to be well settled by case law,
Rulings, and Code sections, considerable overlap and duplication still exist.
The (D) reorganization by definition must qualify under section 354, 355,
or 356. Each of these sections in turn calls other Code sections into play. For
example, control as defined in section 368(c) plays a major role in the dis-
qualification of (D) reorganizations, yet no formal Code reference is made
to this subsection.
The (D) reorganization may be acquisitive as well as divisive. If the (D)
is qualified under section 354(b) (1) (A), an acquisition similar to an (A)
reorganization is effected. But it is not the transferor corporation that acquires;
the transferee corporation must take "substantially all" the assets of the trans-
feror. Absent qualification under section 354, the (D) must meet the rigorous
tests of section 355. This section presupposes the existence of numerous com-
plicated conditions which few corporations can meet. Section 356 is simply
the "boot" section for sections 354 and 355. It permissively allows extra con-
sideration to pass in qualified exchanges in which something other than stock
or securities pass. Section 356 per se is not a qualifying section for the (D)
reorganization.
The purpose of this Article is to present the pattern, incongruous at times,
of qualification and disqualification of (D) reorganizations. An explanation
of, or comparison with, analogous areas will be offered in order that the
reader may draw his own conclusions.
In all likelihood the (D) reorganization has not seen full growth in the
present state of case law or Ruling interpretation. Historically, inconsistent
[Vol. 25
THE (D) REORGANIZATION
resolution of similar facts by different tribunals has had the effect of reaching
a decisive solution without protracted delay. It is hoped that this Article may
speed the (D) reorganization to its ultimate destination.
The reasons for having a corporate reorganization are varied, as is the selec-
tion of the type to be employed. The importance of section 368 is that it
allows corporations to reorganize under one, or even in some instances a
combination, of the subparagraph types without recognition of tax to either
the shareholder or corporation. Only the form in which the business is con-
ducted is changed. This is not deemed by Congress to be a significant event
for the recognition of tax. As such, the bases of the assets and shares of stock
usually remain unchanged in the exchange.
The (D) reorganization has undergone a number of changes over the
years. The Revenue Act of 1918 first introduced the concept of a tax-free
reorganization.1 While the (A), (B), (C), and (F) reorganizations became
a part of the Code in 1921,' it was not until the Revenue Act of 1924,' that
the (D), although not then so titled, was born. Changes in both content and
enumeration persisted until the (D) was finalized in the 1954 Code as:
Sec. 368. Definitions Relating to Corporate Reorganizations.
(a) Reorganization-
(1) In GeneraL-for purposes of parts I and II and this part, the term
,reorganization' means-
(D) a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another
corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one
or more of its shareholders (including persons who were sharehold-
ers immediately before the transfer), or any combination thereof, is
in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred; but
only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of the corpora-
tion to which the assets are transferred are distributed in a trans-
action which qualifies under section 354, 355, or 356 ....
The (D) reorganization moves in the Code as the knight in chess. As the
other reorganization types amalgamate and combine, the (D) divaricates in
dividing corporations. It becomes compatible again by qualification under
section 354, where it resembles the theme of all other reorganizations. The
(D) is used by both the taxpayer and Commissioner in an attempt to achieve
a result not necessarily favored by the other, a nuance not present in the
other reorganizations.
Though divisive, it may also be acquisitive, in the sense that a control of an
almost limitless number of corporations may be obtained by the transferor's
shareholders. By definition the (D) requires a qualifying distribution and
obtention of control of the transferee. If for some reason the (D) is not
completed by the qualifying distribution, but the requisite control is present,
still no tax results because section 351 has been met.'
Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057.
'Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
'Act of June 3, 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253. The (D) was then enumerated (B).
4 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 368 (a) (1) (D) [hereinafter in textual material the cur-
rent Code will be referred to by section number only].
I See notes 245-57 infra, and accompanying text.
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Through the development of case law and rulings the (D) has evolved
into an area of some mathematical exactitude, in that the objective standards
are fairly ascertainable. Nevertheless, there are present all the nebulae of
engrafted principles emanating from the application of the subjective stand-
ards of law common to all tax transactions which help to cloak the pro-
vision in mystery.
The following reflects the development of the (D) reorganization. Often
the objective standards of qualification are met, yet subjective standards are
lacking. The criteria, objectives, and sanctioned and prohibited usages will
be discussed. However, no claim is made that a consistent treatment has en-
sued with the interpretation of the (D) reorganization requirements. In areas
in which inconsistencies abound, an aspirant guess will be made in an effort
to resolve the resultant dilemmas.
I. JUDICIAL HISTORY
1. Generally. Before the 1954 Code the (D) reorganization did not require
a distribution of the securities received.6 By judicial interpretation a transfer
could be made in a liquidation through the shareholders to the transferee
corporation or from the transferor to the transferee. While the taxpayer had
used the (D) as a shield from taxation on the theory that no economic gain
is actually realized on the transaction," the Commissioner used it as a sword
to attack liquidation-reincorporation cases."
The amendment to subparagraph (D) in 1954 was intended to cause tax-
ation in the (D) situation unless there was a transfer of substantially all of
the assets as a qualification to the reorganization.9 Otherwise, it was believed,
such a situation involved true economic gain. While Congress intended to
help the Commissioner combat the reincorporation problem," instead it ob-
structed his efforts. The amendments made it easier for the taxpayer to trans-
fer assets to a new corporation because of the protection of qualification under
section 354.
In 1954 the House of Representatives attempted to deal with the problem
in H.R. 8300. This bill provided that (1) if tax avoidance was the principal
purpose of the transaction, (2) the transferee is formed within five years of
liquidation of the transferor, and (3) fifty percent of the transferee's assets
were transferred to the transferor with continuity of at least fifty percent of
the stock in the former shareholders, taxation of the retained assets as a divi-
"For example 5 112(g) (1) (C) of the 1934 Revenue Act read: "[A] transfer by a
corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the trans-
fer the transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the
assets are transferred." Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, S 112(g) (1) (C), 48 Star. 680.7 See R. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 152 (3d series 1940).
" Discussed in section IV infra.9 As required by INT. REv. CODE of 1954, 5 354(b) (1) (A).
"To play the liquidation-reincorporation game, the taxpayer liquidates the old corpora-
tion under § 331, siphons off the non-essential liquid assets, reports all gains at capital gain
rates, and puts the balance of the assets back into a new corporation. The Commissioner
asserts that in essence a (D) reorganization took place. The assets retained are distributions
to which § 356 applies, resulting in dividend treatment.
H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954),
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dend would result to the shareholders. Unfortunately for the sake of clarity
in this area, the Senate rejected the House bill, commenting that the possi-
bility of tax avoidance was not sufficiently serious at that time to require a
special statutory provision."2 Apparently the thinking was that the problem
could be treated within the existing framework of the law. Except for judicial
gloss on the affirmative usage of the (D) reorganization, the Commissioner
lacks reincorporation weapons."i
2. "Business Purpose" Interpretation. It was a (D) reorganization that
spawned the famous" business purpose doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering."
Mrs. Gregory owned all the stock of United Mortgage Corporation, which in
turn owned 1,000 shares of Monitor Securities Corporation. Her desire was
to obtain the latter stock, but if United sold it, and distributed the funds to
her, the distribution would be a dividend. Averill Corporation was formed,
to which United spun off Monitor. Mrs. Gregory liquidated Averill, sold
Monitor, and reported capital gains. The Supreme Court said that there was
no business purpose involved and that the transaction was nothing but a tax
avoidance scheme. Even though the literal requirements of a reorganization
had been followed, no business purpose was present; thus, dividend treatment
became applicable.
Anticipating the problem of what seemed to be large amounts of revenues
escaping taxation via the spin-off route, Congress withdrew nonrecognition
of gain in spin-off distributions in the Revenue Act of 1934," even before
the Gregory decision was handed down by the Supreme Court. But spin-offs
came back into the fold when section 317(a) of the Revenue Act of 1951
amended the 1939 Code by adding section 112(b)(11),' extending non-
recognition of gain to the spin-off. Part of the Gregory business purpose re-
quirement was added at that time to subparagraphs (A) and (B) under the
amended section." The 1954 Code reiterates the tax-free treatment, provided
the stock or securities received are distributed pursuant to a qualifying trans-
action under sections 354, 355, or 356."'
The issue may arise of whether the business purpose is that of the corpora-
tion or the shareholders. In a closely held corporation the two may become
inseparable, and it may be impracticable to make the distinction."
3. Continuity of Interest-Before and After. Decisions under the 1939 Code
placed emphasis on the shareholders' continuity of interest in the new corpora-
tion created by the reorganization transfer. If a shareholder divested himself
of all stock in the old corporation for that of the new corporation, there was
1 SENATE-HOUSE CONFERENCE COMM. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954).
"This is not to overlook the standard tools of INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §5 269, 482.
"Or, as preferred by many, infamous.
15293 U.S. 465 (1935).
" Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, 48 Star. 680. Tax free treatment had previously been
accorded by the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Star. 253.t Act of Oct. 20, 1951, ch. 521, § 112(b) (11), 65 Stat. 493.
sid. §§ 112(b)(11)(A) & (B).
"9 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (D).
"Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 649-50 (1st Cir. 1949).
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no continuity of interest." His interest was not counted in determining whether
a substantial interest as represented by the other shareholders carried over
into the new corporation. Continuity of interest under the 1939 Code did not
require complete participation; seventy percent of the shareholders would
suffice if they participated in the new corporation."
The 1954 Code virtually eliminates the continuity of interest doctrine in
(D) reorganizations. The wording "one or more of its shareholders (includ-
ing persons who were shareholders immediately before the transfer)," if
taken literally, would not require more than one shareholder to carry the
burden if he has eighty percent control. Some authorities, however, believe
that old case law would still be applicable so as to impose the substantial
continuity of interest requirement." This pessimism is not shared by the In-
ternal Revenue Service, however. In Revenue Ruling 57-311"' one shareholder
in a two-man corporation took all of the stock of a new corporation (the
product of a devisive reorganization under section 355) in a (D) reorganiza-
tion. Even though this represented only fifty percent continuity of interest,
qualification was not at issue nor even discussed.
Under the 1939 Code (and it must be presumed to be the same under
the 1954 Code) the courts would not tolerate a sham reorganization in which
the main shareholders totally withdrew or only held token shares in the new
corporation." If this holds true today, the "one or more shareholders" will
have to be substantial shareholders."6
Continuity of interest, and for that matter the qualification of the (D) it-
self, is not disrupted by liquidation of the transferor after the transferee has
received the assets in exchange for stock or securities.' Nevertheless, if the
purpose of the reorganization is to achieve a liquidation, the necessary continu-
ity will be lacking.'
"See Morgan v. Helvering, 117 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1941); Case v. Commissioner, 103
F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1939); Weicker v. Howbert, 103 F.2d 105 (10th Cir. 1939).
12Reilly Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1951), aff'g 13 T.C. 919
(1949).
23 Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954:
Corporate Distributions, Organizations, and Reorganizations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 393, 419
(1955). The authors believe that Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287
U.S. 462 (1933), and Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951), would be invoked in a (D) reorganiaztion if
something less than a substantial number of the old shareholders were involved.
24 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 243.
"Weicker v. Howbert, 23 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1256 (D. Colo. 1938), afl'd, 103 F.2d 105
(9th Cir. 1939). See also Riddlesbarger v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1952);
Hendee v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1938).
"6As a practical matter, a minor shareholder would seldom receive a significantly larger
distribution in shares of a new corporation over his pro rata holdings in the old corporation.
Arms-length dealers do not ordinarily possess such poor acumen as to divest themselves of
their property without consideration. If the disproportion is too great, the transfer may have
the overtones of a gift. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 274 (1954). Though all
commentators cite this Report for authority on the gift theory, the author has seen no cases
holding that a gift ensues.
'"Helvering v. Schoellkopf, 100 F.2d 415, 417 (2d Cir. 1938).
2"This occurred in Glenn v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 127 F.2d 820 (6th Cir.
1942), af'g 37 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. Ky. 1941). The shareholder-taxpayer was the largest
creditor of his corporation. He took a portion of the assets in liquidation to apply on the
indebtedness, then put the balance of the assets in a new corporation. The appellate court
ruled against a liquidation-reincorporation conrention by the Government.
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II. REQUIREMENTS OF A (D) REORGANIZATION
A. Control After the Transfer
"Control" is a Code requirement for all section 368(a)(1) reorganiza-
tions. It has not changed materially since the beginning of the reorganization
provisions. Section 368(c) defines "control" as: "the ownership of stock
possessing at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all classes
of stock entitled to vote and at least 80% of the total number of shares of
all other classes of stock of the corporation." 9
The decisions with respect to reorganizations other than (D) are appli-
cable, as well as control cases involving section 351, since all refer to section
368(c) as their "control" section. The definition of control under the 1939
Code is the same in the 1954 Code. Failure to meet the eighty percent con-
trol requirements of section 368(c) will cause disqualification of the reor-
ganization in toto.0
1. Percentages. Manifestly the most important percentage of control to obtain
is at least eighty percent average control on voting stock and eighty percent
control of each class of nonvoting stock. The percentage requirement does
not mean that one hundred percent of the former shareholders must partici-
pate in the reorganization."' Before the 1939 Code, 68.93 percent of the
shareholders participating in the new corporation was sufficient."' Even under
the 1939 Code not all the transferee shareholders in a (D) reorganization
were required to own eighty percent of the transferor's stock.' As an example,
it would be permissible for the transferor's shareholders to own only 75.9
percent of the transferor's stock yet acquire 87.5 percent of the stock of the
transferee. 4 The emphasis in this area is plainly after, not before the trans-
action.
It is also settled that the shareholders need not maintain the same relative
proportionate interests after the reorganization as were maintained before."
This may certainly work to the shareholders' advantage in closely held corpora-
tions by allowing a shifting of equity ownership without the disturbance of
control. In planning the capital structure of a new corporation for the purpose
of effecting a reorganization, it is well to keep in mind that the authorized
stock provided for in the corporate charter will not affect the control per-
29 INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954, S 368(c).
3 The definitive language of the (D) uses the word "control," which brings § 368(c)
into play. See also 3 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 20.91 (rev. ed.
1965).31Reilly Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 382 (5th Cit. 1951), aff'g 13 T.C. 919
(1949). See also Miller v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 415 (6th Cir. 1936).
3 See note 15 supra, and accompanying text.
$ Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Jones, 58 F. Supp. 967 (W.D. Okla. 1944), appeal dismissed
per stipulation, 147 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1945).
"Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1956), af'g
23 T.C. 196 (1954).
3'Roosevelt Inv. Corp., 45 B.T.A. 440 (1941). See also Weicker v. Howbert, 103 F.2d
105 (10th Cir. 1939). There is no proportionate requirement under the 1954 Code. Rev.




centage. The control is computed on the basis of stock issued and outstand-
ing.
36
2. Options, Warrants, and Subscriptions. Reorganizations may become the
normal occasion for the issuance of certain contractual rights to the share-
holders, and possibly to creditors of other third parties, for acquisition of
equity ownership in a corporate party to the reorganization. Of necessity this
will usually be the transferee, since it is generally a newly formed corporation
with a capital structure designed primarily to effect the wishes of the trans-
feror-controller corporation. To what extent, then, will the issuance of op-
tions, warrants, and subscriptions affect the control requirements of sec-
tion 368(c) ?
Warrants clearly do not count; control relates only to issued stock."7 Sub-
scription agreements are treated in the same manner.' The theory is that state
law is usually determinative of the status of the stock underlying the subscrip-
tion agreement. Ordinarily state law will prohibit the issuance of the stock
until consideration is received for it." Options follow the same treatment as
given warrants and subscription agreements."
Some confusion may be generated by the attribution rules in the area of
options. Section 318(a) (4) provides that an option holder is deemed the
owner of the stock under option. Nevertheless, the attribution rule of section
318 has been interpreted not to apply to corporate reorganizations because
that section is not located in the same subchapter.4 '
3. Intention To Control. Perhaps the most difficult criterion in ascertaining
control is the intent of the parties to control the transferee after the reorgan-
ization. There should be a bona fide intent to control the transferee. This is
not to say that the control may not be relinquished shortly thereafter; indeed,
the timing of the relinquishment is of minor importance. Several tests come
to mind in this regard. Could the reorganization have been accomplished with-
out relinquishing control? Was there a contract present requiring divestiture
of the controlling interest? Other questions delve into the substantive heart
of the reorganization. Did the stockholders intend to keep control from the
outset, or bail out after the reorganization? Could the end result of the re-
organization be obtained without surrendering control?
If a reorganization conceivably may be consummated with the requisite
control, that will probably constitute patent satisfaction of section 368(c).
But if the intentions of the transferors from the beginning are that the con-
-American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 177 F.2d 513(3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950); Louangel Holding Corp. v. Anderson,
9 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
87 ames Q. Newton Trust, 42 B.T.A. 473 (1940), aff'd, 122 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 315 U.S. 802, aff'd sub nom. Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., 316 U.S. 527(1942).
8C.T. Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1937).
"See, e.g., TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.22 (1969). A majority of states have
similar laws.4
1Commissioner v. National Bella Hess, Inc., 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1955), aff'g 20
T.C. 636 (1953).
"
1Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743 (1965).
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trolling shares will be sold in a public offering, then control immediately
after the reorganization will be found lacking." This is perhaps another occa-
sion to apply the step transaction principle--control is not deemed conclusive
at any intermediate step in the reorganization, but rather at the completion
of the overall plan.'
A finding of lack of intent to control is by no means limited to the situation
of a public offering. Control may be transferred to a third party, who in turn
effects a sale to an outside group. If disposition is contemplated from the
origination of the plan, and such disposition forms an integral part of the
reorganization, control immediately after the transfer will not be found."
A recent ruling is indicative of this point. In Revenue Ruling 70-225'
the taxpayer proposed a (D) reorganization qualifying under section 355.
The stock received in the spin-off was to be transferred in a subsequent (B)
reorganization with another corporation as part of the overall plan. The
Service ruled that the requisite control was lacking, since the taxpayer never
intended to retain it, but instead to dispose of it immediately in the subse-
quent (B). The transaction could not be salvaged under section 351 because
that section also looked to section 368(c) for the definition of control. More-
over, the (B) transaction would not stand on its own since it was viewed
as a transfer of assets to the ultimate transferee corporation, rather than as an
acquisition by that transferee of all the stock of a previously existing corpora-
tion in exchange for its own voting stock. Not only would the fair market
value of the stock distributed be deemed taxable to the shareholder, but gain
would also be recognized to the distributing corporation on the transaction."
4. The Binding Commitment. Closely associated with the determination of
the intentions of the transferor is the search by the courts for a binding com-
mitment to divest control of the transferee. If such a commitment is found
in any part of the reorganization plan, control will not be found.47 An example
of this type of agreement is in the delivery of the greater part of the con-
trolling stock interest to outsiders upon receipt of the stock after the reor-
ganization.'
The elusive thing about the binding commitment requirement is that it has
no time limit for upsetting control. As long as the commitment is present,
'Overland Corp., 42 T.C. 26 (1964). In this particular case the "intentions" were re-
inforced by a court order providing for a sale. The court also noted that without a public
sale to raise additional capital, the reorganization would have been fruitless.
4' Overland Corp. cited as authority for this principle Bassick v. Commissioner, 85 F.2d
8 (2d Cir. 1936), af'g 30 B.T.A. 163 (1934), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 592 (1936). Much
to the same effect is American Wire Fabrics Corp., 16 T.C. 607 (1951), where momentary
control was in the transferor, but it was part of the overall plan to dispose of it.
"Maine Steel, Inc. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Me. 1959).
41970 INT. REv. BULL. No. 19, at 15.
4"An almost identical fact situation occurred in Rev. Rul. 54-96, 1954-1 CUM. BULL.
111, the "basis" part of that ruling modified in Rev. Rul. 56-100, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 624.
7 The Tax Court made this broad explanation in American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C.
397, 405-06 (1948), for its holdings in Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 513
(3d Cir. 1937), and Bassick v. Commissioner, 85 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1936).
" Commissioner v. Schumacher Wall Board Corp., 93 F.2d 79 (9th Cit. 1937), aff'g
33 B.T.A. 1211 (1936). A similar holding is in Manhattan Bldg. Co., 27 T.C. 1032
(1957), acquiesced in, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 5.
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the reorganization control is not measured until its fulfillment."" If, after satis-
fying the commitment to divest, control is present, then there is no problem.
As in Halliburton v. Commissioner,"0 control may be held for twenty-two
days, yet if it must be contractually divested at the end of that time, the re-
organization will fail to qualify. Halliburton involved the incorporation of a
partnership under an agreement to convey more than the controlling interest
to seven oil companies.5 The same theory was applied to a contract with an
underwriter to dispose of control by public trading, even though control was
maintained for three weeks after the transaction was consummated."2
5. Momentary Control. It would seem at first blush that if a holding period
of three weeks will not suffice, how could anything less qualify? However,
absent a commitment to dispose of control, instantaneous or even momentary
control will satisfy section 368(c).
The First Circuit found no trouble with momentary control in Portland
Oil Co. v. Commissioner." The court placed emphasis on the lack of obligation
to sell the controlling interest to third persons, and even remarked in dictum
that it should make no difference if the transferor is already under a previous
contractual obligation to convey stock to a third person at the time it is
received." However, this posture has not been tolerated by the majority of
decisions on this point. As noted, a previous commitment to divest control
is destructive of a valid reorganization."
Another situation that comes dangerously close to nonqualification is one
in which the taxpayer is not bound to give away control, but does so immedi-
ately after the consummation of the reorganization. This occurred in Wilgard
Realty Co. v. Commissioner." The taxpayer conveyed the controlling stock
interest by gift to relatives on the day of receipt. The court found no difficulty
in sustaining control in the taxpayer. It even went so far as to state that it
would be immaterial whether the taxpayer had a preconceived plan to dispose
of the controlling interest, absent a binding obligation to do so." This reason-
ing may be tolerable, but it does not explore in depth the intentions from the
beginning of the reorganization. It may be permissible to change one's mind
subsequently, or to have an unforeseeable change of circumstances cause loss
of control immediately after the transaction, but it is quite another thing
to ignore the taxpayer's ab initio intent to divest himself of control.
49 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 30, § 20.91, at 421.
5078 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1935).
" Note that this case did not involve a reorganization, but rather the equivalent of a
§ 351 transaction, i.e., incorporation of a going concern. The law today is that incorporating
a business for no other purpose than to qualify for a reorganization is not sufficient. West
Coast Marketing Corp., 46 T.C. 32 (1966).
"'Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1937), rev'g on other grounds
32 B.T.A. 110 (1935).
5 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940), aff'g 38 B.T.A. 757
(1938).
109 F.2d at 490.
See note 47 supra, and accompanying text.
56 127 F.2d 514 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 655 (1942).
"Ild. at 516. The court placed the basic distinction between this and Bassick v. Com-




6. Creditors. Debt holders of a corporation are not equity holders in the
strict sense of the word. The history of all types of reorganizations is fraught
with the interjection of bonds, notes, debentures, etc., in place of equity shares,
so that continuity of interest may become obscured to the point of nonquali-
fication. Control by creditors has presented no less a problem.
In Commissioner v. Cement Investors, Inc." the Tenth Circuit regarded
bondholders as stockholders in a (D) reorganization, finding that they had
acquired an equitable interest in the property and, therefore, had supplanted
the stockholders. Thereafter, the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Southwest
Consolidated Corp." refused to hold that bondholders could be regarded as
stockholders for purposes of control in a reorganization under the Revenue
Act of 1934.
A slight inroad into the holding of Southwest was made in the later Sixth
Circuit opinion of Sieberling Rubber Co. v. Commissioner."0 The petitioner
corporation possessed an unsecured indebtedness from another corporation
in which it held a controlling interest. The Sixth Circuit, reversing the Tax
Court, held that a (D) reorganization took place even though there was an
indebtedness exchanged for a stock interest. Southwest was not even cited in
the majority opinion."*
The Seiberling case did not regard as material the fact that the petitioner-
stockholder was largely a creditor of the company to which the assets were
transferred. The main interest transferred was that of the indebtedness, and
such interest constituted "property" in the eyes of the court and qualified the
transaction even under section 112(b)(5) of the Revenue Act of 1934."
The court observed:
[I1t makes no difference whether control was retained by the old stockhold-
ers, in their capacity as such stockholders, or because of the fact that they were
creditors. It is enough that the persons having control of the new company
were former stockholders, although they received the stock in the new com-
pany resulting from the reorganization in their capacity as creditors of the
old company."
Seiberling and Southwest may be distinguished on the basis that a pure
creditor situation will not succeed, yet a mixture of shareholders and creditors
58 122 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1941).
59315 U.S. 194 (1942), rev'g 119 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1941). The Court made this
statement, 315 U.S. at 202:
Indeed Clause C contemplates that the old corporation or its shareholders,
rather than its creditors, shall be in the dominant position of 'control' im-
mediately after the transfer and not excluded or relegated to a minority
position. Plainly, the normal pattern of insolvency reorganization does not fit
its requirements.
60 169 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1948).
61 It was cited in the dissent, id. at 606, for the proposition that bondholders, not the
stockholders, received controlling interest in the new corporation.
62This section is the forerunner of INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 351, permitting in-
dividuals or partnerships, like corporations, to change the form of doing business tax free,
although not constituting a reorganization because the transferors may not be corporations.
Moreover, there is no distribution mechanism in S 351 as in a qualified (D) reorganization.
8" 169 F.2d at 598. Cited as authority for this statement was Prairie Du Chien-Marquette
Bridge Co. v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1944); accord, Commissioner v. Hunt-
zinger, 137 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1943).
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will. The distinction is, however, doubtful at best, and can only serve as a
caveat to the draftsman of a reorganization.
7. Third-Party Control. Logic would dictate that control in the hands of
parties foreign to the original transfer would disturb the qualification of the
reorganization. Yet if the third party is used as an "accommodation" to the
transaction, and there is no intent for the third party to own or possess the
control stock for more than the time necessary to perform his function, control
will not be disturbed."
The third-party control argument may come in handy to tax counsel in
opposing a liquidation-reincorporation attack by the Service. The taxpayer
may argue that the control requirements are not met if more than the neces-
sary percentages are in the hands of outside third parties. But to succeed in
such argument, the taxpayer must not fall into the trap of Reef Corp." The
stockholders in that case "sold" their stock to a trustee. The trustee did not
negotiate, furnish consideration of his own, or incur personal liability. The
Tax Court sustained the Commissioner in declaring the trustee to be a mere
conduit, and that no valid sale was intended. The trustee could, therefore,
acquire no control: the old stockholders had the requisite control before and
after the transaction.
The most recent authoritative interpretation of section 368(c) control in
(D) reorganization appeared in Breech v. United States.7 A complex inter-
relationship of corporations and shareholder ownership is described in the fol-
lowing diagram.
BREECH DIAGRAM
4Handbird Holding Corp., 32 B.T.A. 238 (1935).
"Liquidation-reincorporation problems are treated in section IV infra.
" 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379 (1965).
67439 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971). Breech was apparently consolidated with Drummond
on the Government's appeal.
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The central issue was whether eighty percent control under section 368(c)
was present so as to qualify a (D) reorganization. The Government con-
tended that a sale of assets of Valley-1 to Valley-2 constituted a (D) re-
organization. The subsequent distribution to the shareholders would consti-
tute boot under section 356 and be taxable as a dividend to them to the extent
of Valley-l's accumulated earnings and profits.68 To reach the requisite eighty
percent control, the Government read the (D) phrase "any combination
thereof" to refer to the stockholders of the transferor corporation. The argu-
ment ignored the ownership by San Jose, and the shareholders of San Jose
were deemed part of the combination to meet the eighty percent requirement.
The court found the argument unpersuasive. It noted that the attribution
rules of section 318 were not applied by Congress to cases of this sort. Refer-
ence was even made to the 1939 Code section 112(g) (1) (D), which re-
quired that the control rest "in the transferor or its shareholders or both."
The court believed that the phrase "any combination thereof" meant that
some, rather than all of the transferor's shareholders could combine with the
transferor to comply with the eighty percent rule."9
8. Creeping Control. The ordinary method of acquiring control is by obtain-
ing the stock or securities in a single transfer from the transferee. If a small
percentage of control is acquired from a previous transaction, or a series of
transactions, "creeping" control results."0 This is permissible in (D) reor-
ganizations. It was allowed in a reorganization in which over seventy percent
of the assets of the new corporation were acquired by cash purchase nearly
a year before the reorganization. "
Creeping control is no defense to a liquidation-reincorporation attack by
the Service. It is not a valid argument that control of the transferee must
be acquired in the transfer process. The existence of control over the trans-
feree by the transferor or its shareholders immediately after the transfer is
all that is required. 2
9. Attribution. The attribution rules of section 318 do not apply to stock
control in corporate reorganizations. This principle was dramatically noted in
Drummond v. United States." The Commissioner mounted a liquidation-rein-
corporation attack against the taxpayer's claimed section 331 liquidation.
The court found the liquidation bona fide and the requisite control lacking.
It did not apply the attribution rule in section 318, but stated that the appli-
cable attribution rule was that of section 368(c)." Drummond fails to give
any reasons for this attribution conclusion. Section 368(c) does not of itself
"
8Id. at 411. The opinion omits the section under which a (D) formally must qualify
by definition, i.e., §§ 354, 355, or 356. If the (D) indeed is deemed "qualified" under §
356 for boot treatment, and, therefore, dividend in this case, how is the transaction classified
as a tax-free reorganization in the first place, viz., § 368(a) (1) (D)?
"Quoted as authority was S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 368 (1954).
" "Creeping" control is mentioned in B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, FEDERAL TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 14.13 (3d ed. 1971).
"'Commissioner v. Bankers Farm Mortgage Co., 145 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1944).
"Retail Properties, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1463, 1472 (1964).
"68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9608, at 88,095 (C.D. Cal. 1968).41d. at 88,097, Conclusions of Law, 5 6.
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give any hint as to whom control may be attributed, nor on what basis. The
court may have meant there is another attribution rule available for section
368(c); however, it did not name that section. The court was possibly re-
ferring to section 368(a) (1) (D), by which the transferor or one or more
of its shareholders qualify as owners.
10. The Government's Position. The Service's position on the definition of
control is expressed in Revenue Ruling 59-259." In that situation there was
more than an eighty percent average ownership of the total number of shares
of outstanding nonvoting stock, but ownership of only twenty-two percent
of one class of nonvoting stock. This reorganization failed to qualify under
section 368(c), which was interpreted to require ownership of at least eighty
percent of each class of nonvoting stock. It should be noted that averaging
may be done in case of voting stock. It is not necessary to own eighty percent
of each class of voting stock." Some classes of stock are nonvoting in some
respects, yet have special voting privileges in others. Which is the proper
classification? The Service has taken the position that the right to elect direc-
tors is the determinative factor in "voting power.""
The Service has made one exception to the stock control requirements.
In Federal Housing Administration insured mortgage loans, there is sometimes
a requirement in the financing arrangement that a special class of stock be
issued to the FHA for security purposes.' These are not regarded as classes
of stock for section 368(c) purposes, and no control is needed for a reor-
ganization."'
The Service has been anything but consistent in its policy on control. In
1956 the Service allowed a corporation to gain the requisite control before
the reorganization." The transferor corporation owned only twelve percent
of the preferred stock of the transferee corporation. In order to get the requi-
site control under section 368(c), the transferee corporation issued additional
shares of common to the preferred owners in exchange for the preferred.
The transferor corporation then had ninety-three percent of the common,
and the necessary control. In 1963, however, the Service rejected a similar
attempt to qualify a reorganization by gaining control beforehand. The sole
stockholder of one corporation also had thirty percent of another corporation.
He gave enough of that stock to his own corporation to give it eighty percent
control. The Service referred to the control given the solely-owned corporation
as "transitory and illusory," and stated that section 355 does not apply to a
transaction where there was an immediately preceding contribution to capital
in an attempt to effect a nontaxable distribution."
75 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 115.
"' See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 63-260, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 147.
77 I.T. 3896, 1948-1 CUM. BULL. 72.
7824 C.F.R. § 207.18(c) (1971).
7
"Rev. Rul. 66-333, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 114.
"Rev. Rul. 56-117, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 180. Under the 1939 Code it was not per-
missible to gather control immediately before a reorganization as part of the complete plan.
See J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INcOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 32.08A
(1971).
",Rev. Rul. 63-260, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 147.
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Any distinction between the 1956 and 1963 rulings is further confused
by a 1969 ruling on the obtention of control before a reorganization. 2 The
same problem existed: only seventy percent control was present. In a tax-free
(E) reorganization by the transferee, a recapitalization was accomplished in
which class A and B voting stock were issued. The transferor corporation then
obtained eighty percent voting control by exchanging common stock for
class B voting stock. The class A voting stock was issued to others. The sur-
render of the common stock by the transferor corporation for the class B
stock was a transaction to which section 354 applied. Revenue Ruling 63-26083
was distinguished on the ground that the (E) recapitalization in the instant
situation resulted in a permanent realignment of voting control.
The distinction could be cast on other grounds. Both the 1956 and 1969
rulings concerned the use of the reorganization provisions, whereas the 1963
situation involved mere contribution to capital. The distinction may, therefore,
be viewed as the procedural manner of qualifying a transaction before the
actual reorganization takes place. The distinction cannot be grounded in the
use of section 355, because the 1963 ruling and 1969 ruling both involved
that Code section. The Service will probably condone the additional control
obtained through other corporate reorganizations rather than allow the less
subtle means of direct cash acquisition.
The Service frequently takes the position that liquidation-reincorporations
occur in commonly-owned corporations where transfers give rise to the occa-
sion. One of the few instances of a happy ending for the taxpayer in a suc-
cessful liquidation-reincorporation assertion by the Commissioner occurred
in Revenue Ruling 57-311." The two shareholders decided to discontinue
doing business in a particular city. One shareholder was to continue the opera-
tions under another corporation. The departing shareholder took cash in re-
demption for his complete holdings in the old corporation, but the amount
taken equalled only about ten percent of the value of his shares. He then
transferred that cash to a new corporation in exchange for all of its stock."
For no consideration, the old corporation transferred its assets to the new
corporation.8" The assets transferred were worth approximately the same as
the value of the shares previously held by the departing shareholder. The
Service treated this transaction as a (D) reorganization, primarily on the
basis of the control over both corporations. In the eyes of the Commissioner
the old corporation transferred assets to a new corporation in exchange for
all the stock of the latter. That stock was then distributed to the retiring
shareholder. Since the assets transferred were qualified under the section
355 (a) five-year active business requirement, no gain or loss was recognized
to shareholder or corporation.
A striking distinction between this ruling and other liquidation-reincorpora-
8 Rev. Rul. 69-407, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 50.
83 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 147.
84 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 243.
8 As an aside, it should be noted that the shareholder obtains complete control of the
new corporation under S 368 (c).
Be If there were more than two shareholders some objection might be made to a transfer




tions is that no dividend treatment was given the shareholder on his receipt
of cash. Almost without exception liquid assets as well as cash retained on
liquidation receive section 356(a) (2) treatment when the (D) is success-
fully asserted. Good judgment was exercised by the Service in this case, how-
ever, for the shareholder did not retain the cash, but plowed it back into the
new business.
In Revenue Ruling 70-24087 a common owner of two corporations caused
one to sell its operating assets to the other and liquidate under section 331.
Since the common owner had control of both corporations, the transaction
met the qualifications of section 368(a) (1) (D). No additional stock had
to be issued; the owner had one hundred percent control. The operating assets
were regarded as "substantially all the properties" within the meaning of
section 354(b) (1) (A). The earnings and profits of both corporations could
be considered for purposes of determining the extent of the dividend distri-
bution under section 356(a) (2)." The cash distribution was, therefore, tax-
able to the extent of the combined earnings and profits of both corporations.
The distinctions between these two rulings are fairly apparent. In Revenue
Ruling 70-240 the common owner siphoned off approximately fifty percent
of the total assets as a liquidating distribution. Moreover, there was no re-
cited business purpose for the transfer of assets. The position taken by the
Service is not unusual.
Yet the Government does not always antagonize sole shareholders in the
control of multiple corporations. In Revenue Ruling 70-18" a sole share-
holder owned two corporations, which in turn owned a third corporation.
The two corporations merged, and distributed the stock of the third to the sole
shareholder. The distribution was allowed without recognition of gain under
section 355. The Service apparently saw nothing wrong with letting the
shareholder own directly what he had previously owned indirectly.
The Government does not view the transfer of cash as a factor disturbing
control. Cash transfers arise in (D) reorganizations when two businesses of
unequal size must be divided. The Service will allow cash to be transferred
in the reorganization to equalize the relative values. The transaction will still
qualify as a (D) reorganization under section 355."0
B. Plan of Reorganization
Neither the 1939 nor the 1954 Code defines the meaning of a "plan
'Rev. Rul. 70-240, 1970 INT. REv. BULL. No. 20, at 17.
"' Cited for authority in the ruling on this point was Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d
874 (5th Cit. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
19 1970 INT. REV. BULL. No. 2, at 9.
90Rev. Rul. 56-655, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 214. The allowance of balancing in the (D)
in the transfer process is also evidenced in the REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FI-
NANCE, S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 274 (1954):
Your committee's bill has altered the definition to provide that if the control
of the transferee corporation is in the transferor corporation or in persons
who were shareholders of the transferor, or any combination thereof, the trans-
fer will, nevertheless qualify as a reorganization under section 368(a) (1)-
(D), the control owned by these persons need not be in the same proportion
as it was before the transfer.
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of reorganization." The Regulations mention the "plan" twice,'1 but in neither
reference can any substantive content or clarification be found. Case law has
developed the required elements of the "plan."
The plan of reorganization is a necessary element in any reorganization,
(D) or otherwise. Without it no reorganization can occur, whether the tax-
payer or the Commissioner is advocating the advent of a reorganization.'
Usually, the plan of reorganization will take the form of corporate resolu-
tions and minutes, ordinarily drafted by the parties' attorney. These documents
will contain all the elements necessary to accomplish a tax-free reorganization,
and will probably be labeled "Plan of Reorganization" to remove a revenue
agent's doubts. Even absent such formal preparation, the decisions indicate
that a plan can be found in nearly any situation.
1. Form of Plan. The Regulations would have us believe there are strict and
formal requirements to have a plan.' The Treasury states that the plan must
be adopted by each corporation, and by their responsible officers, and appear
upon the official records of each corporation." The Regulations are silent
as to when shareholder approval may be required.
If there is one theme followed by the courts, it is that the plan of reor-
ganization need not be in writing; the actions of the parties speak for them-
selves. 5 It is not necessary that there be a formal plan; " it is sufficient if there
"t The first mention appears under "Definition of Terms" in Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (g)
(1955):
The term 'plan of reorganization' has reference to a consummated transaction
specifically defined as a reorganization under section 368(a). The term is not
to be construed as broadening the definition of 'reorganization' as set forth
in section 368(a), but is to be taken as limiting the non-recognition of gain
or loss to such exchanges as are directly a part of the transaction specifically
described as a reorganization in section 36 8(a). Moreover, the transaction,
or series of transactions, embraced in a plan of reorganization must not only
come within the specific language of section 368(a), but the readjustment
involved in the exchanges or distributions effected in the consummation
thereof must be undertaken for reasons germane to the continuance of the
business of a corporation a party to the reorganization. Section 368 (a) con-
templates genuine corporate reorganizations which are designed to effect a
readjustment of continuing interests under modified corporate forms.
The second mention of the plan appears under the heading "Records to be kept and in-
formation to be filed with returns" in Treas. Reg. § 1.368-3 (a) (1955): "The plan of re-
organization must be adopted by each of the corporations parties thereto; and the adoption
must be shown by the acts of its duly constituted responsible officers, and appear upon the
official records of the corporation." (The Regulation continues with a list of the items to
be filed as a part of the income tax return for the year in which the reorganization oc-
curred).
92 As is discussed in section IV infra, the Commissioner often insists a (D) reorganiza-
tion occurs when a reincorporation follows a liquidation, or transfers are made from one
closely held corporation to another. For a recent example, see Rev. Rul. 70-240, 1970 INT.
REV. BULL. No. 20, at 17.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.368-3(a) (1955), quoted in note 91 supra.94Id.
'- Pebble Springs Distillery Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1956); Ketler
v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1952); C.T. Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d
582, 585 (8th Cit. 1937) ("It need not be reduced to writing."); Prentis v. United States,
273 F. Supp. 460, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("it need not be reduced to writing"); William
C. Kind, 54 T.C. 600, 608 (1970) ("a formal plan need not be adopted"); James G. Mur-
rin, 24 T.C. 502 (1955) (oral plan); Peeler Hardware Co., 5 T.C. 518 (1945), aff', 155
F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1946); Hortense A. Menefee, 46 B.T.A. 865, 868 (1942); Edison Sec.
Corp., 34 B.T.A. 1188 (1936); William H. Redfield, 34 B.T.A. 967 (1936); Preston
Wilson, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 676 (1961).
'"Prentis v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); William C. Kind, 54
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are other circumstances that indicate a plan of reorganization exists. These
circumstances are largely governed by the existence of intent to reorganize,
rather than to liquidate or effect a distribution. A 1937 case provides an
example of the judicial attitude toward the plan in construing a (D) reor-
ganization:
We find nothing in the statute prescribing that the plan of reorganization
must be in any particular form. It need not be reduced to writing. It may be
amended as circumstances dictate. But when carried out, it must leave the
transferor with an interest in the transferee, and this interest must be definite
and material, and must represent a substantial part of the thing trans-
ferred ....'
2. Intent. As mentioned, the reorganization will not stand or fall on the form
of the transaction, but the intent of the parties to reorganize will be regarded
with utmost significance. It is generally from the acts of the parties that the
courts deduce their intent in any given transaction." But the requisite intent
will not be found if other purposes for the transaction exist that supersede
or control the parties' actions."' If the intent is to accomplish a purchase or
sale rather than a reorganization, the plan will fail.' The same result is
reached when the intent is to achieve a bona fide liquidation.10' Similarly, the
intent to form a plan will be found lacking if the transaction takes place at
a point in time when an intent to reorganize could not have been formed."'
A subsequent disposition of the stock acquired in a reorganization will not
defeat it if it was not intended originally as part of the plan of reorganiza-
tion."
3. Contents. Ideally the plan should contain all the essential elements of a
reorganization. These would include (1) the assets to be transferred, (2)
the stock or securities received on the exchange, (3) the amount of shares
distributed to each shareholder, and whether any shares are to be redeemed
from the shareholders in the exchange,"3 and (4) the business purpose and
T.C. 600 (1970); Ethel K. Lesser, 26 T.C. 306 (1956); Transport Prods. Corp., 25 T.C.
853, 858 (1956); James G. Murrin, 24 T.C. 502 (1955); Charles R. Mathis, Jr., 19 T.C.
1123, 1128 (1953) (dictum that it is unnecessary for the plan to be written and incor-
porated into the minutes of the corporation).
97C.T. Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 1937).
'American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 161, 168, 399 F.2d
194, 199, motion to vacate opinion denied, 185 Ct. Cl. 161, 402 F.2d 1000 (1968):
Taxpayer's intent is considered in determining the existence of an overall plan
to accomplish a particular result by a series of steps and in determining the
existence of a plan to reorganize. The existence of either a plan to reorganize
or a plan to accomplish a particular end result, however, does not necessarily
mean that the particular route chosen to accomplish the desired result quali-
fies as a reorganization, as that term is defined in the statute.
See also Charles R. Mathis, Jr., 19 T.C. 1123 (1953); Wilgard Realty Co., 43 B.T.A. 557
(1941), af1'd, 127 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 655 (1942).
"'Charles R. Mathis, Jr., 19 T.C. 1123 (1953).
"o Caldwell v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 308 (M.D. Pa. 1939), aff'd on other grounds,
114 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1940); Huey & Philp Hardware Co., 40 B.T.A. 781 (1939).
'o' Cushman Motor Works v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1942), afg sub
nom. Charles D. Ammon, 44 B.T.A. 1288 (1941); Sharp v. United States, 263 F. Supp.
884 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
"°
2John Levene, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 800 (1944).103Robert Campbell, 15 T.C. 312 (1950), acquiesced in, 1951-1 CtuM. BULL. 1.
' In a "spin-off" no shares need be surrendered by the shareholders; in a "split-off"
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facts leading up to the proposed reorganization. The contents of the plan are
important for the additional reason that they determine who are parties to
the reorganization."
The courts have often found the contents of a reorganization plan when
no plan was intended. A plan of complete liquidation sufficed as the contents
of a plan in Retail Properties, Inc." A contract for the acquisition of additional
shares of one of the parties to a merger qualified as a plan in Rawco, Inc.'
07
4. The "Steps." As mentioned, an unwritten plan will not defeat a reorganiza-
tion if the necessary elements are present. To find a plan of reorganization
among several transactions the courts have resorted to the "step transaction"
doctrine. Accordingly, the plan is found among the several "steps" taken by
the parties to achieve the end result. If the steps are "successive," rather than
"independent," a reorganization plan may be found--even against the tax-
payer's wishes.1"' The step transaction doctrine has also been labeled the
Ctsingle transaction" doctrine,"" but the meaning is the same.
The Tax Court seems to place greater emphasis on the first and last steps
to determine if a reorganization was intended." Yet, if the circumstances so
warrant, the Tax Court will view the detailed steps in their entirety t to
ascertain if the steps in reality are parts of an integrated transaction."" The
steps constituting the plan do not have to be performed in any given time
period, but should have some degree of continuity or reflect a consistency in
performance of the plan."' It is extremely helpful if the steps must be taken
under some form of legal compulsion,"4 such as a contract or court order, as
the end result can be said to have been "planned" from the beginning.
5. Amendment. It appears to be settled that a plan or reorganization may be
amended when the circumstances so dictate.' But a change of the plan is
shares in the transferor corporation are exchanged for the distributed shares of the trans-
feree corporation to which the assets were transferred.
"'Robert Campbell, 15 T.C. 312 (1950); see Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 40 B.T.A. 1100
(1939), aff'd, 115 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 699 (1941); George
D. Graham, 37 B.T.A. 623 (1938). See also 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 30, S 20.95.
10623 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1463 (1964).
10737 B.T.A. 128 (1938). See also Watts v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 981 (2d Cir.),
aff'd, 296 U.S. 387 (1935).
... Swanson v. United States, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9624 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
0"'Rinkel v. Knox, 196 F. Supp. 21, 24 (D. Minn. 1961): "It is the government's posi-
tion that all the steps in this attempted reorganization plan constituted a single transaction
arising out of an integrated plan."
" FEthel K. Lesser, 26 T.C. 306, 311 (1956): "We may examine the first and the last
in the series of transactions in order to decide whether or not a reorganization was effected."
William M. Liddon, 22 T.C. 1220, 1225 (1954) : "When we must determine whether there
has been a reorganization, a liquidation, a sale, or an exchange in a series of transactions,
it is proper for us to look at the beginning and end of the series."
11 PHoward Hotel Corp., 39 B.T.A. 1147, 1153 (1939).
""Retail Properties, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1463 (1964). See also Ketler v. Com-
missioner, 196 F.2d 822, 826 (7th Cir. 1952): "Our inquiry must be whether the transac-
tions were so related that they possessed an integrated tax significance or whether each was
so isolated and independent as to give rise to a separate tax consequence.
"'Hortense A. Menefee, 46 B.T.A. 865, 868 (1942).
"'United States v. Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828
(1953).
"'C.T. Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 1937); Brown v. Heiner,
15 Am. Fed. Tax R. 899 (W.D. Pa. 1933); cf. John C. Shaffer, 28 B.T.A. 1294 (1933);
Win. Hewitt, 19 B.T.A. 771 (1930). See also 3 J. MERTiS, supra note 30, 5 20.64,
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to be distinguished from a change of circumstances. In Giles E. Bullock"' a
sale by one of two common shareholders so changes the circumstances that
the transaction could not be carried out according to the original plan, and
was, therefore, deemed a partial liquidation.
6. "In Pursuance of." The existence of the plan is necessary, but compliance
with the plan is required as well. The transfer or exchange must be made
pursuant to the plan of reorganization.11 ' Two criteria have been suggested
in determining whether an exchange is pursuant to the reorganization plan:
(1) it should be germane to the business of one corporate party to the re-
organization; or (2) it should effect a readjustment of interests in the cor-
porate parties to the reorganization."' If a major shareholder does not accept
the plan, and deals individually with the transferor, the transaction will be
taxable because it was not in pursuance of the plan of reorganization."' Like-
wise disqualified from the reorganization shelter was a preliminary exchange
of stock between two shareholders of the parties to the reorganization. 2" The
reorganization was tax-free, but the exchange was not pursuant to the plan
of reorganization. It was viewed as an adjustment between two shareholders
and not protected by the reorganization that followed.
7. Time. There seems to be no limitation on the amount of time the plan of
reorganization may be in effect before being fully consummated. One re-
organization plan was in existence fifteen years before completion.'' The plan
had the advantage of being court-approved in connection with an insolvency
reorganization. In Roosevelt Hotel Co."' the indenture trustee took possession
of the corporate property and held it for four years before a plan of re-
organization was adopted. The court observed that there is nearly always a
delay before bondholders and creditors arrive at a satisfactory solution, and
noted that a delay of eighteen months was tolerated by the Supreme Court
in Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co." Recently a lapse of three
years has been declared not too lengthy for a (C) reorganization to take
place, citing an example'" wherein five years elapsed and the reorganization
was still valid.1"
11626 T.C. 276 (1956), aff'd per curiam, 253 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1958).
"
T Prentis v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
18 Manning, 'In Pursuance of the Plan of Reorganization': The Scope of the Reorgani-
zation Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARV. L. REv. 881 (1959).
19 Wm. Hewitt, 19 B.T.A. 771 (1930), appeal dismissed, 76 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1935).
It is to be remembered that under the 1939 Code, with regard to spin-offs, § 112(b) (11)
provided for nonrecognition of gain to shareholders who receive stock in a parry to the
reorganization "in pursuance of the plan or reorganization," without their surrender of any
stock. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 521, § 112(b) (11), 65 Stat. 493 (1951); Revenue
Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 112(g), 47 Star. 197.
"'Edison Sec. Corp., 29 B.T.A. 483 (1933), aff'd in part and remanded, 78 F.2d 85
(4th Cir. 1935). To the same effect is Walter B. Lashar, 34 B.T.A. 768 (1936), where the
taxpayer made a sale of stock received in a reorganization independent of the plan; gain
was recognized on the transaction. See also 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 30, § 20.64: the ex-
change must be made in pursuance of the plan, not because of the plan.
... Pearson Hotel, Inc. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Ill. 1959).1"2 13 T.C. 399 (1949).
1'315 U.S. 179 (1942).
..
4 D.W. Douglas, 37 B.T.A. 1122 (1938).
121 Prestoo Wlsoa-, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 676 (1961).
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The closer the instances occur in time, the stronger is the inference that
the transactions were part of a plan."' The spread of the steps of the plan
over a period of time will not be material, "so long as the steps [are] a
consistent performance of the reorganization plan and purpose.
'27
As stated, the events and transactions must be in pursuance of the plan.
Stated conversely, the plan should not be adopted after the occurrence of
the events. Yet one (D) reorganization seemingly has violated this rule. In
Morley Cypress Trust, Schedule "eB''"" the equal shareholders of a timber
corporation received liquidating distributions over a four-year period. In the
last year oil was discovered. A new corporation was formed. The assets of
the timber corporation were issued to the new corporation in exchange for
stock of the latter. The Tax Court held that all the factors of a reorganization
were present. The fact that the old corporation was in the process of liquida-
tion did not defeat reorganization.
The more logical rule was stated recently in Nadeau v. United States."'
If the plan was adopted subsequent to the events constituting the reorganiza-
tion, the steps taken were done in pursuance of the plan, and accordingly no re-
organization will be found. 0
8. Third Parties. The presence of third parties is not fatal to a plan of re-
organization. In the liquidation-reincorporation areas the taxpayer's argument
that conveyance to or from the parties disqualify the reorganization is usually
not sustained."' In an insolvency reorganization the passage of the property
through a bondholder's committee in the course of a transfer from the old
corporation to the new did not prevent the transaction from being a re-
organization, since it was merely a transitory step.' If it is part of the plan
that trustees or creditors take temporary possession of the assets while a new
corporation is formed, the reorganization will still qualify."'
C. Parties to a Reorganization
In addition to having control and a plan, the taxpayer must also be a
party to the reorganization. To oversimplify the matter, only parties to the
reorganization receive the tax-free treatment of exchanges of stock and assets,
as well as receipts of worthy emoluments from other parties to the reorganiza-
don.
The Code definition of the (D) reorganization does not contain language
concerning the parties to a reorganization. Subsection (b) of section 368
does, however, give a definition of the parties for purposes of all six basic
types. The first portion only of this subsection is applicable to the (D):
"
2 Love v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 236, 238 (3d Cir. 1940).
..
7 Hortense A. Menefee, 46 B.T.A. 865, 868 (1942).
1283 T.C. 84 (1944). Cited as authority were Love v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 236 (3d
Cir. 1940); Anna V. Gilmore, 44 B.T.A. 881 (1941).120 181 F. Supp. 752 (W.D. Mich. 1960).
130 Id.
1 31Ethel K. Lesser, 26 T.C. 306 (1956); Bard-Parker Co., 18 T.C. 1255, afl'd, 218
F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1954).
132 Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942).
","Adamston Flat Glass Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 809 (1947); cf. Standard Coal, Inc., 20 T.C. 208 (1953).
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"[Tlhe term 'a party to a reorganization' includes-(1) a corporation re-
suiting from a reorganization, and (2) both corporations, in the case of a
reorganization resulting from the acquisition by one corporation of stock or
properties of another.""N
A corporation resulting from the reorganization may be a newly created
corporation to which assets are transferred in exchange for the controlling
interest of the transferee." It may also consist of two corporations in a "split-
up" wherein the old corporation ceases to exist and the assets are transferred
to two other corporations."
Plainly, paragraph (2) is descriptive of the (D) reorganization with re-
spect to the language "acquisition by one corporation of stock or properties
of another." In the (D) the transferor acquires the stock of the other in
exchange for assets. By the same token, the transferee is acquiring property
of the transferor, so there is certainly no quarrel that both corporations are
parties to the reorganization.
The Regulations do not clarify the parties in the (D) reorganization. Pur-
porting to define a "party to the reorganization" for all six types, section
1.368-2(f) states only this language with respect to the (D):
Both corporations are parties to the reorganization if Corporation M trans-
fers all or a part of its assets to Corporation N in exchange for all or a part
of the stock and securities of Corporation N, but only if (1) immediately
after such transfer, Corporation M, or one or more of its shareholders (in-
cluding persons who were shareholders immediately before such transfer),
or any combination thereof, is in control of Corporation N, and (2) in pur-
suance of the plan, the stock and securities of Corporation N are transferred
or distributed by Corporation M in a transaction in which gain or loss is not
recognized under section 354 or 355, or is recognized only to the extent pro-
vided by section 356.'"
Since this part of the Regulation merely repeats the language of subpara-
graph (D), whether subsidiaries or multiple corporations may be used under
the 1954 Code and Regulations is apparently an open question.
Subparagraphs (C) and (D) under section 368(a) (2) allow transfers
of assets or stock to subsidiaries in certain (A), (B), and (C) situations,
as well as the use of a controlling corporation's stock in a statutory merger.
Omitted is whether a (D) reorganization may permit transfers or the use of
stock or property on the part of either transferor or transferee before the
qualifying distribution under sections 354, 355, or 356.
It should be recalled that prior to the 1954 Code there was no provision
requiring the distribution of the stock or securities received by the transferor
from the transferee. Court decisions did permit more than two corporations
to be parties to a reorganization under the 1939 Code. But if the 1954 Code
requires that the securities received be distributed under sections 354, 355, or
356, how can subsidiaries or parents become parties to the (D) reorganiza-
134INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 368(b).
" Old or new, 9 368(c) control is still required. See also B. BiTrKER & J. EUsTIcE,
supra note 70, § 13.01.
13O B. BirrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 70, § 13.01.
"'Treas. Res. 5 1.368-2(f) (1966),
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tion? Apparently they may participate only as shareholders. A parent may
receive the stock of the transferee in a distribution by the subsidiary-trans-
feror under section 354, but its participation is that of a shareholder of the
transferor, and not that of a "party" to the reorganization.
There is perhaps one technical situation in which the parent controlling the
(D) transferor is literally a party under the (D) definition. If the parent
also owns stock in the transferee before the transfer, then as a shareholder
together with the transferor (its subsidiary), the control test of section 368(c)
is met. If the parent were not a shareholder of the transferee preceding the
transfer, it would not be a party to the reorganization. Its only participation
would be the receipt of the stock or securities under sections 354 or 355.
Bittker suggests another manner in which subsidiaries may be used in a (D)
reorganization." Assuming a parent owns all the stock of a subsidiary, this
stock may be transferred to another corporation (the transferee) in exchange
for controlling interest in the latter. The stock of the subsidiary is an asset
in the hands of the parent, and can thus qualify as the "asset" in a (D) re-
organization that may be transferred to the transferee. The parent and the
transferee are clearly parties to the reorganization under section 368(b) (2),
but is the subsidiary whose stock was used as the asset being transferred?
Apparently it is, since it also falls within the liberal definition of section
368(b) (2): the transferee is acquiring stock of the subsidiary, which at the
same time is property of the parent corporation. But if by some stretch of
the imagination the subsidiary is not a party, the transaction is not affected
because the parent is still undeniably a party to the reorganization.1"
Revenue Ruling 57-4654" affirmed this use of a subsidiary to accomplish
a (D) reorganization which involved foreign corporations attempting a mer-
ger. Since the (A)-type merger provision contemplates only mergers effected
under the laws of the United States, states, territories, or the District of
Columbia,"4 the transaction would have to qualify under another subpara-
graph. The parent corporation was a domestic corporation owning all the
outstanding stock of a foreign subsidiary corporation, which in turn owned
all the outstanding stock of another foreign corporation of the same country.
This latter stock was the principal asset of the first subsidiary. For valid
business reasons the first subsidiary merged into its wholly owned subsidiary.
The ruling treated this situation as a (D) reorganization qualifying under
section 354(a) (1).
The unusual feature of the ruling is that it treats the transferor as being
the first subsidiary under the parent corporation, rather than the parent itself.
The parent could be viewed as the transferor, and the asset transferred as the
first subsidiary's stock. Instead the ruling treats the asset transferred as the
second subsidiary's stock, which the second subsidiary will receive upon the
merging of the first subsidiary into it. The stock of the survivor (the second
subsidiary) is then distributed under section 354(a) (1) to the parent corpora-
131 B. BiTTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 70, 5 14.32.
"'By virtue of INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(b) (2).
140 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 250.
""See Treas. Reg. S 1.368-2(b) (1966).
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tion, who takes it as a shareholder-not a party to the reorganization-but
from a party to the reorganization.
It is difficult to justify the decision that the asset transferred is the survivor's
stock. The ruling recites that the stock will only be cancelled so that new
shares are issued in their place. Has the survivor really received anything at
all for the newly issued shares? The language of the ruling reflects a lack
of consideration of this question: "In the instant case, the principal asset of
Y corporation (its stock of Z corporation), while it will be transferred to
Z corporation, will be transferred only for cancellation and will not be re-
ceived or held by Z corporation as an asset."'45
The contrary argument has substantial merit--even using the authorities
cited by the ruling. " In Helvering v. Schoellkop'"" an (A) merger was re-
jected on substantially the same pattern, but a (D)' was upheld. The trans-
fer of additional assets, admittedly of little value, together with the stock was
sufficient to qualify the transaction. In Helvering v. Leary'" the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that both an (A) and (D) reorganization took place on substan-
tially the same facts. No importance was placed upon the fact that the trans-
feree received its own stock in the transaction. The court also noted that the
various subdivisions of reorganizations do overlap.47
(D) reorganizations involving subsidiaries are not well defined in the
Code or case law. It would always be advisable to seek a ruling from the
national office before proceeding if it seems that a subsidiary might not be
a party to the reorganization.
D. "Substantially All"-Section 354(b)(1)(A)
The (D) definition speaks of the necessary transfer of assets as only "all
or part." It is only by reference to one of the qualification sections, section 354,
that the term "substantially all" is found. Section 354(b) (1) (A) carves
out an exception to the qualification of exchanges under section 354(a) in
(D) reorganizations unless "(A) the corporation to which the assets are
transferred acquires substantially all of the assets of the transferor of such
assets . 1..."'48 As in other instances, the Code does not define "substantially
all." The regulations paraphrase the Code, but add that section 354 is not
precluded from application to the (D) reorganization if the properties re-
tained or received in the exchange are used to satisfy existing liabilities in-
curred in the ordinary course of business before the reorganization.'"
14 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 252.
"' Helvering v. Schoellkopf, 100 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1938). Judge Learned Hand stated,
id. at 416:
The taxpayer argues that the New York company acquired all the properties
of the Maryland company when that company transferred to it its own shares
and the miscellaneous assets. As to the shares we do not agree; the shares of
a company, when transferred to itself cannot properly be regarded as property
acquired; the shares are merely extinguished.
'"100 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1938).
"The (D), of course, was not of that letter in 1939. The provision was then under
the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 2, § 112(i) (1) (B), 45 Star. 791.
1- 93 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1938).471d. at 828, citing Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935).4 lNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 354(b) (1) (A) (emphasis added).
'
48 Treas. Reg. § 1.354-1(a) (2) (1966).
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A recent Ninth Circuit case, Moflatt v. Commissioner, s has held that a
specific percentage of assets need not be transferred. On this issue "the nature
of the properties retained by the transferor, the purpose of retention, and
amount thereof""1 ' became important. The Moffatt court based its decision
upon a revenue ruling.. interpreting the phrase "substantially all the proper-
ties" in a (C) reorganization. The ruling would not apply a mechanical test
to the language in a (C) reorganization, and apparently such a test will not
be applied in section 354(b) (1) (A) for (D) reorganizations. The dissent
in Moflatt noted that under the 1939 Code "substantially all of the proper-
ties" meant at least eighty percent of the properties, including the intangi-
bles." The percentage of assets transferred was only 64.52 percent, which,
the dissent argued, did not constitute "substantially all."
Section 354(b) (1) (A) and Mofiatt were construed subsequently in Oscar
E. Baan".4 and were held not to to applicable to that fact situation. The court
made the distinction on the basis that the transfer involved only the operating
assets of one business, while other operating assets were retained and utilized
in the remaining business. James Armour, Inc."' interpreted the "substantially
all" requirement of section 354(b) (1) (A) as necessitating the transfer of
all the assets essential to the conduct of the business enterprise. It should be
noted that nonessential assets, unnecessary for the conduct of a business, that
are retained or distributed to the shareholders will only serve to contrast and
point up the "essentiality" of the assets transferred. '"
The decisions indicate that the key to "substantially all" is the transfer of
"operating assets." Once there has been such an exchange or transfer, section
354(b) (1) (A) is satisfied. If an essential operating asset is retained, the
"substantially all" requirement is not met. The Court of Claims recently made
this latter finding in Ross Michael Simon Trust v. United States."' The re-
tendon of cash was regarded as an essential operating asset because the pur-
ported transferee could not bid on future construction work without a cash
reserve." The Court of Claims opinion seemingly agreed with Mo fatt, noting
in dicta that in service businesses such as those in Moflatt, the operating as-
sets essential to a business may be its employees, and their transfer may con-
stitute "substantially all" of the assets."
10363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), aff'g 42 T.C. 558 (1964), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1016 (1967).
"1 363 F.2d at 267.
"'Rev. Rul. 57-518, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 253.
". See authorities collected at 363 F.2d at 270.
154 51 T.C. 1032, 1040 (1969).
'543 T.C. 295 (1964).
"6As stated in Ralph C. Wilson, Sr., 46 T.C. 334, 346 (1966): "That all of the assets
needed in the conduct of Associates' business were transferred to Agency can also be shownby an examination of the assets not transferred."
1'185 Ct. Cl. 291, 402 F.2d 272 (1968).
158 Several recent decisions have interpreted the "substantially all" requirement to neces-
sitate the transfer of liquid assets. In Simon v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 291, 307, 402F.2d 272, 280 (1968), the Court of Claims equated liquid assets and operating assets. In
a more recent case, Swanson v. United States, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9624 (E.D. Cal. 1970),
the Government contended that the taxpayer's § 337 liquidation and subsequent reincor-poration was in fact a (D), (E), or (F) reorganization. The district court noted that the
liquid assets of the old corporation were not transferred to the new. Thus the "substantially
all" requirement for the (D) was not met. Id.19 185 Ct. Cl. at 307, 402 F.2d at 280.
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A safe harbor for those not wishing to speculate on the requirements of
transferring "substantially all" the assets is found in Revenue Procedure
66-34.16° The Service takes the position that the "substantially all" require-
ment of section 354(b) (1) (A) "is satisfied if there is a transfer of assets
representing at least 90 percent of the fair market value of the net assets
and at least 70 percent of the fair market value of the gross assets held by
the corporation immediately prior to the transfer." ''
A ruling pursuant to this revenue procedure is obviously not open to the
taxpayer who becomes the subject matter of a liquidation-reincorporation con-
tention by the Commissioner. Such was the occasion in the recent Tax Court
case of Mark DeGroff." ' The taxpayer had three corporations, and attempted
a liquidation under sections 331 and 346. The sales operation of the liquidated
corporation was transferred to another controlled corporation without business
interruption. The principal contention of the taxpayer to defeat the applica-
tion of the "substantially all" requirement was that an exclusive license agree-
ment had not been transferred. The court noted that the taxpayer retained
sufficient control over his enterprises to allow the transferee merely to in-
fringe on the license agreement without a formal transfer. The court cited
instances in which intangible assets not appearing on a corporation's balance
sheet may properly be taken into account in determining whether the "sub-
stantially all" requirement has been met."'
In Reef Corp.'" the Tax Court held that the "substantially all" requirement
of section 354(b)(1) (A) was met notwithstanding the fact that a large
amount of cash had been borrowed and distributed to the shareholders before
the main transfer of assets.'6 '
To transfer "substantially all" the assets it is not required that a transferee
receive its own stock in the transaction. This argument was advanced by the
taxpayer in Retail Properties, Inc.'" but was rejected by the Tax Court, which
observed that four out of five total parcels of rental realty were transferred
to a subsidiary. The fact that stock was a nonoperating asset was enough for
the court to disregard its nontransfer, even though the value of the stock
exceeded the value of the real estate.
DeGro§f and Retail Properties, Inc. demonstrate the ease with which the
transfer of "substantially all" the assets can be facilitated when the Commis-
sioner is so asserting. The other cases are indicative of judicial attitude in
marginal cases-when the taxpayer is advocating compliance with section 354.
A good business purpose for the retention of liquid assets, or even essential
assets, will furnish no justification for failure to transfer what the court may
ultimately find to be "substantially all" the assets.
160 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 1232. The Service will follow certain operating rules in issuing
ruling letters, as outlined in this procedure.6  Id. at 1233.
16254 T.C. 59 (1970).
'"Id. at 73; John G. Moffatt, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966); Ralph C. Wilson, Sr., 46
T.C. 334, 345-48 (1966).
10424 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379 (1965).
'"Id. at 395.
1 523 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1463, 1472 (1964).
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III. COMPARISONS WITH OTHER REORGANIZATION TYPES
1. The (A) Reorganization. Section 368(a)(1) (A) is a statutory merger or
consolidation.16 ' One basic requirement of the merger for tax purposes is that
its accomplishment be recognized under state law." The manner in which the
acquisition (or exchange or transfer) is accomplished is liberally defined,
and cash, securities, preferred, etc., may be used to gain the necessary interest
under state law needed for the merger. The shareholders of the old corpora-
tion become shareholders of the new in a tax-free exchange of stock or securi-
ties. How, then, are the (D) and (A) comparable?
The similarity can be close, depending on the completion of the reorganiza-
tion. As an example, Revenue Ruling 58-93"'" involved the formation of
a new subsidiary to which a seventy-nine percent owned subsidiary transferred
all its assets, and then merged with its parent. The Service treated this as a
valid (A) reorganization, and regarded the transaction as if the parent had
transferred the assets to the new subsidiary.17 But a (D) reorganization could
not have been completed by a distribution of the new subsidiary stock under
sections 354 or 355 because eighty percent control was lacking.
An (A) merger became a (D) reorganization in Revenue Ruling 57-465.171
A foreign subsidiary of a domestic parent merged into its subsidiary. The
foreign subsidiary's principal asset (the stock of its own subsidiary) was
transferred to that subsidiary in exchange for shares in it. The Regulations
do not allow a merger unless effected pursuant to the laws of the United
States, state, or territory, or the District of Columbia."2 But since the second
subsidiary was acquiring "substantially all" the assets of the first, the require-
ments of section 354(b) were met for the (D) to be qualified.
It is also permissible to use an (A) merger with a (D) reorganization. In
Commissioner v. W. Morris Trust' a (D) reorganization qualifying under
section 355 took place immediately before a merger. Part of the business of
the state bank transferor needed to be spun off before a merger with a na-
tional bank to comply with national banking laws. The fact that the state
bank did not survive the merger would not preclude the (D) and (A)
combination from qualifying. 4
Finding a (D) reorganization in a typical merger situation as in Revenue
Ruling 57-465 is unique. It is an exceptional circumstance that will probably
not occur except in the instance of foreign subsidiaries. Even without this
exception, the substantial overlap between these types can cause differing
tax treatment depending on the final label used. The use of another type of
167 In a merger one of the parties survives, the other goes out of existence. In a con-
solidation, both parties go out of existence. A new corporation takes the place of both.
'See Edward H. Russell, 40 T.C. 810, 822 (1963).
169 1958-1 CUM. BULL. 188.
17 The Service noted that under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (2) (C) the parent
may transfer the assets acquired in a merger to a new subsidiary, but that this usually oc-
curred after the reorganization, not before.
17' 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 250; see note 143 supra.
'
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b) (1966).
1 3367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966).
"1"d. The court noted that there was no requirement of continuing control of the trans-
feror which went out of existence. The control of the "spun-off" business was still main-
tamined in the old shareholders on the receipt of stock in the transaction.
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reorganization in conjunction with a (D) reorganization as accomplished in
Morris Trust may be hazardous. As will be seen below, the other reorganiza-
tion may divest the transferor of control, or it may be deemed one step in a
step transaction asserted by the Service. Any number of evils can befall the
planner unless the pattern has been positively established.
2. The (B) Reorganization. Section 368(a)(1) (B) is defined as the acqui-
sition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting
stock, of stock of another corporation if, immediately after the acquisition,
the acquiring corporation has control of such corporation. The principal differ-
ence between the (D) and (B) reorganization is that various assets are
used in the (D) for the acquisition, whereas the (B) uses voting stock only.
In some circumstances the (B) and (D) reorganizations can look alike.
The 1964 amendment to section 368 allows a corporation to use the stock
of its parent in a (B) reorganization. Since this stock might also constitute
"assets" that could be used in a (D) reorganization, the pattern seems similar.
However, the (D) reorganization must go one step further: it must be
qualified under sections 354 or 355. If the stock of the parent constituted
"substantially all" the assets of the subsidiary, and the stock received were
distributed under section 354, the transaction would fit both (B) and (D).
A (B) reorganization does not require, however, that the stock of the trans-
feree be distributed. But section 354 does not preclude a voluntary distribu-
tion if the other requirements of a reorganization are accomplished.
The (D) and (B) combination arose recently in Revenue Ruling 70-225 1
in which a corporation spun off assets of one business to a subsidiary, qualify-
ing under section 355, and distributed the stock to the sole shareholder of
the parent. As part of the plan the sole shareholder exchanged the subsidiary
stock with an unrelated corporation in which he received less than controlling
interest. The latter transaction was intended to meet the (B) requirements.
Neither reorganization qualified. The (D) reorganization failed because con-
trol was not obtained under section 368(c). It was part of the plan that
control of the subsidiary would be lost in the subsequent (B) reorganization
that followed. The (B) part of the reorganization did not qualify because
it was viewed, in effect, as a transfer of assets by the parent corporation to
the unrelated corporation for a part of the latter's stock, thus failing as a
stock-for-stock (B) transaction.'
Revenue Ruling 70-225 should be contrasted with Revenue Ruling
70-434.' In this latter ruling a corporation operated two businesses, only
one of which was attractive to a prospective acquiring corporation. To divest
itself of the undesirable business, the corporation spun off the undesirable
business, representing twenty-three percent of the assets, to a newly created
corporation and distributed the stock to its shareholders in a qualifying (D)
reorganization. The acquiring corporation then obtained all the stock of the
target corporation in exchange for its voting stock. The Service ruled that
175 1970 INT. REv. BULL. No. 19, at 15.
176 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 111, as modified with respect to the basis in Rev. Rul. 56-100,
1956-1 CUM. BULL. 624.
17 1970 INT. REV. BULL. No. 34, at 11.
[Vol. 25
THE (D) REORGANIZATION
the latter transaction was a (B) reorganization. It curiously added the lan-
guage that the stock of the newly created corporation distributed to the target
company's shareholders was not property of the acquiring corporation.
The rulings are quite similar in principle, achieve the same intended busi-
ness purpose, but differ in result. Why is not the loss of control of the target
corporation in Revenue Ruling 70-434 interpreted in the manner of Revenue
Ruling 70-225? After their (D) reorganizations, both corporations lost inde-
pendent control in a (B) reorganization. The two rulings may be reconciled
superficially, but substantive distinction appears to be lacking. The acquiring
corporation did not acquire eighty percent of the target corporation, taking
into account the spun-off assets. Revenue Ruling 70-225 and Revenue Ruling
70-434 cannot be distinguished on the basis of the lack of foreseeable plan-
ning, since both envisaged disposition of more than eighty percent control
from the beginning. The distinction simply does not appear within the present
refinements of reorganization law.
3. The (C) Reorganization. Section 368(a) (1) (C) is defined as an acqui-
sition by an acquiring corporation of substantially all of the properties of
another corporation, in exchange solely for voting stock of the acquiring
corporation or its parent. In the (C) reorganization the acquiring corpora-
tion may also use a limited amount of cash or corporate property with the
voting stock.
In the instance of a (C) and (D) overlap, the Code has come to the
rescue. Section 368(a) (2) (A) states that if the transaction is described in
both the (C) and (D) definitions it will be treated as a (D) reorganization.
Seemingly the reason for section 368(a) (2) (A) is that Congress intended
section 355 to apply notwithstanding the fact that no distribution of the
transferee's stock subsequently ensued. '"
4. The (E) Reorganization. Section 368 (a) (1) (E) is defined simply as "a
recapitalization." Bittker lists four methods by which a recapitalization may
occur."9 Generally the capital structure is changed in the (E) reorganization.
The (D) and (E) reorganizations are totally dissimilar since there is no
acquiring or acquired corporation; the new corporation is merely a "reincar-
nation"18 of the old.
5. The (F) Reorganization. A reorganization under section 368(a) (1) (F)
is defined as "a mere change in identity, form or place of organization, how-
ever effected." In a sense, all reorganizations are changes in minor form and
would seem to fit the definition of (F). In previous examples whether a re-
organization qualifies under one subsection or another has generally been
immaterial. Differentiation between (D) and (F) reorganizations becomes
material insofar as application of other Code sections is concerned. For ex-
ample, section 381(b) applies restrictions to (F) types but not to (D) re-
178Goldman, The (C) Reorganization, 19 TAx L. REv. 31, 39 (1963).




organizations. Congress apparently believed that a change of accounting pro-
cedure would be authorized when the business form is changed substantially,
but not when the substance of the organization remains unchanged. "'
Section 1244(d) (2) also applies a different rule to (F) reorganizations.
Stock received in an (F)-type reorganization in exchange for stock meeting
the other requirements of section 1244 is treated as meeting such requirements.
In the comparison between (D) and (C) reorganizations it was seen that
section 368(a) (2) (A) made the (C) a (D) if it could also qualify under
that type. There is no analogous Code section for the (D) and (F). But
Revenue Ruling 57-276"' states that if a reorganization will meet the re-
quirements of subsections (A), (C), or (D), and also qualify as an (F),
the Service will regard it is an (F) reorganization.
IV. LIQUIDATION-REINCORPORATION
The (D) reorganization can be a sword in the hands of the Commissioner
as well as a shield for the taxpayer. The game is played in the following
manner. The taxpayer liquidates his corporation under section 331. The as-
sets received are deemed in full payment for the shares exchanged. Normally
the holding period is long enough for the taxpayer to realize long-term
capital gains. If the fact situation stops here, no problem exists. But if the
taxpaper causes the operating assets to be reincorporated, or vested in a
corporation in which he or his group maintain control, a section
368(a) (1) (D) reorganization occurs. Any assets not reincorporated and left
in his hands are taxed as a dividend under section 356(a) (2).
Any involuntary (D) situation will involve (1) a liquidation of a con-
trolled corporation, and (2) the transfer of the operating assets to another
controlled corporation. There may or may not be retention of nonessential
or liquid assets for the Commissioner to assert as a dividend, but normally
the taxpayer keeps something.
The case law is that any particular situation qualifies as a (D) reorganiza-
tion because section 354 is satisfied. The transfer of the operating assets,
though in some instances admittedly less than even half, nevertheless quali-
fies, because a transfer of "substantially all" the assets under section 354 means
only the essential or operating assets." No percentage test is involved.
But the courts are not as lenient in the control test for application of the
involuntary (D) reorganization. Section 368(c) says eighty percent, and
the decisions agree. Any less control in the taxpayer is not sufficient for a
reorganization.'"
Similarly, the courts have no difficulty in finding a plan of reorganization.
Taking all the steps of the taxpayer as an integrated effort to reach a final
result, a plan can be found. '" As mentioned previously, there is no require-
ment that the plan be in writing.
181 See the discussion in Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125, 136 (5th Cir. 1966).
182 1957-1 CUm. BULL. 126.
... See section H(D) supra.
"84See, e.g., Drummond v. United States, 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9608 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
I" See, e.g., Abegg v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1970).
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The courts have not found it necessary for a taxpaper to receive any new
stock. If the taxpayer has actual control, such a requirement would amount
to an honoring of form over substance.1 No Code section defines the situa-
tion in which a liquidation-reincorporation will be found. The Regulations
do warn of a situation in which a reincorporation is likely to exist. Section
1.331-1(c) states:
A liquidation which is followed by a transfer to another corporation of all
or part of the assets of the liquidating corporation or which is preceded by
such a transfer may, however, have the effect of the distribution of a dividend
or of a transaction in which no loss is recognized and gain is recognized only
to the extent of 'other property.' See sections 301 and 356.18'
A recent revenue ruling, however, has given fair notice of the type of situ-
ation in which the Service will find a (D) reorganization. In Revenue Ruling
70-240" a sole shareholder of two corporations, X and Y, caused X to sell
its operating assets to Y for cash at their fair market value. X liquidated under
section 331, and Y continued to operate the business assets formerly operated
by X. The sole shareholder received the cash for all his stock in X. According
to the Treasury's position a (D) reorganization took place. Since the sole
shareholder owned all the stock of Y, there would be no necessity of receiving
additional shares. The transfer of the operating assets would be sufficient to
qualify as transferring "substantially all" the assets under section
354(b) (1)." The cash received is gain recognized under section 356(a) (1),
and treated as a dividend under section 356(a) (2) to the extent of the com-
bined earnings and profits of both corporations."
It should be stated at this point that not all liquidation-reincorporations
arise under subsection (D). Subsections (E) and (F) have also been recently
used in the courts.9. as well as the Revenue Rulings. If the eighty percent
required control factor is missing from a likely candidate for a reorganization,
the Service will apply subsections (E) and (F). In Revenue Ruling 61-15 6192
the shareholders of the selling corporation owned only forty-five percent of
the stock of the purchasing corporation. The other fifty-five percent was sold
to the public by underwriters. This was held to be a reorganization under
both subsections (E) and (F). The boot kept by the shareholders in the
transfer process was taxed under section 356(a) (2).
The Service will also decline to rule in areas of liquidation followed by a
.
8 Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836
(1961); Ralph C. Wilson, Sr., 46 T.C. 334 (1966).
"'
7Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1(c) (1966).
189 1970 INT. REv. BULL. No. 20, at 17.
..
8 The Ruling cites on this point Rev. Rul. 57-518, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 253; John G.
Moffatt, 42 T.C. 558 (1964), aff'd, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1016 (1967).
"0 The theory of looking to the earnings and profits of both corporations, rather than
just the earnings and profits of X, comes from Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967). The application of Davant to this situation
is rather liberal since that case involved a situation in which it was rather difficult to ascer-
tain from which corporation earnings and profits had been exacted. Here it is rather obvious
that the sole shareholder received his distribution from corporation X.
" See Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1018 (1967) (holding both for a (D) and (F)).
191 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 62.
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reincorporation of all or part of the assets, or in instances in which the
liquidation is followed by a sale of the corporate assets by the shareholders
to a corporation in which the shareholders own more than a nominal amount
of stock.'93
One manner of defeating an involuntary reorganization under subsection
(D) is simply to not have eighty percent control '" after the completion of
the transfer. It worked for the taxpayers before the Tax Court in Joseph C.
Gallagher,"' Austin Transit, Inc.," and in a California district court in
Drummond v. United States."'
The variations of the liquidation-reincorporation system are manifold,
but reach the same result. The first corporation may liquidate and then trans-
fer the assets to the new corporation;... it may also sell the assets, then liqui-
date and transfer either directly"9 to a new corporation, or to the shareholders
who then effect the transfer to a controlled corporation. It may be that the
transferee corporation will be eventually liquidated after the receipt of oper-
ating assets and distribution of stock to the shareholders. In that event the
distribution will be taxed as a dividend."' But even if there is a sale of assets
to a related. corporation, followed by the transferor's liquidation, the (D)
reorganization will be defeated if the former shareholders are not in control.2"'
It has been stated that the 1954 Code dampened the Commissioner's use
of subsection (D) in the liquidation-reincorporation arena."2 This observa-
tion is based on the addition of the language in the (D) definition which
compels a distribution to qualify under sections 354, 355, or 356. This con-
tention should be taken for face value only. Qualification under section 354
is extremely easy-especially when one is not trying. The transfer of "sub-
stantially all" the assets, as required by section 354(b) (1) (A), has been
interpreted as only the operating assets, and this generally occurs. Liquid and
nonessential assets are siphoned off. Again, the plan need not be in writing,
the stock does not have to be issued, and the same business need not be con-
ducted by the transferee corporation. The additional hurdle does not appear
to be too high for the Government to overcome. This argument is buttressed
by the recent holdings in Davant v. Commissioner," and Reef Corp. v. Com-
missioner.'4 Davant involved a fact situation that closely resembled a sham,
". Rev. Proc. 62-32, 1962.2 CUM. BULL. 528, § 3.01, 5 11.
".4 As required by INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 36 8 (c).
"'39 T.C. 144 (1962), appeal dismissed, Nos. 18844, 18845 (9th Cir., Sept. 19, 1963).
"'20 T.C. 849 (1953), acquiesced in, 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 3. The taxpayer won by
only 11%. Only 69% control existed after the transfer in the transferors.
"j 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9608 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
198As accomplished in Richard H. Survaunt, 5 T.C. 665 (1945), af'd, 162 F.2d 753
(8th Cir. 1947).
19 William M. Liddon, 22 T.C. 1220 (1954), rev'd on other grounds, 230 F.2d 304
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956).
"'°Ernest F. Becher, 22 T.C. 932 (1954), aff'd on other grounds, 221 F.2d 252 (2d
Cit. 1956).
... David T. Grubbs, 39 T.C. 42 (1962). In this instance the shareholders of the trans-
feror came up with only 72% control in the transferee.
"'2See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 128,
CORPORATE AcQUISITIONS--(D) AND (F) REORGANIZATIONS, at A-35 (1966).
23366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
"°4368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966). But with Davant and Reef Corp. compare Pride-
mark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965). No reincorporation was held to
exist in the latter case. The grounds expressed, id. at 41, were "because the transactions were
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and Reef Corp. was not much better. It took no stretch of the imagination
for the appellate courts in each instance to find the scheme necessary for
the (D) reorganization.
Not all liquidation-reincorporations have unhappy endings for taxpayers.
In at least one instance it worked to the taxpayer's advantage. In Revenue
Ruling 57-3112" a shareholder had his stock redeemed by the corporation
for approximately ten percent of its value. A new corporation was organized,
to which the shareholder transferred the cash received for his shares in ex-
change for all the stock of the second corporation. The first corporation then
transferred certain operating assets to the second corporation without re-
ceiving any consideration. At this point the shareholder's stock in the second
corporation had substantially the same value as in the first corporation. On
these facts the Service held that a (D) reorganization had taken place. The
position of the Service was that there had been a transfer of assets from the
first corporation to the second, followed by a distribution of the stock of the
second to the shareholder in exchange for his stock in the first corporation.
No gain or loss was recognized to any of the parties.
Admittedly the transaction was more of a redemption from the share-
holder than a liquidation. But, nevertheless, one wonders why the Service
did not take the position that the transfer of assets without consideration to
the second corporation was not a capital contribution. There was no ownership
of the second corporation's stock by the first corporation, nor by any share-
holder, since the redeemed shareholder no longer held any interest in the
first corporation.
The ruling is also rather exceptional because the cash withdrawal escaped
taxation both as a dividend and as a capital gain. Instances are few and far
between in which a taxpayer may withdraw cash without tax effects.
The Service will not always argue that a liquidation-reincorporation oc-
curs. The strategy is slightly hazardous if the courts do not find (1) sub-
stantially all the assets transferred, (2) a plan, (3) control, and (4) lack
of business purpose in the new corporation. A better plan for the Service
may be to deny the existence of a valid liquidation in the first place. Any
distributions to the shareholders without the protective covering of the full
or partial liquidation provisions... would be susceptible to dividend taxation."
The Tenth Circuit seems to view liquidation-reincorporations as "reincar-
nations." Recently in Babcock v. Phillips" a national bank was formed to
take over a state bank's fiduciary assets. The same amounts of stock held by
the shareholders in the state bank were held in the national bank. The state
bank was liquidated, and the capital not needed by the national bank was
distributed to the shareholders. The court held that the national bank was
the reincarnation of the state bank, and that a (D) reorganization took place.
not motivated by a desire to avoid the payment of taxes." Id. at 40 added in dictum that
the effectiveness of the (D) was reduced by the Revenue Act of 1954 because of the addition
of the "substantially all" requirement of § 354(b) (1) (A).
202 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 243.
200 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 331, 346, inter alia.207As did occur in Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, rehearing denied and opinion
amended, 332 U.S. 752 (1947).
28372 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1967).
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The amounts distributed from the state bank constituted boot and were taxed
accordingly under section 356. Babcock did reveal that the Tenth Circuit
would not follow Davant literally. Though Davant found a reorganization,
nevertheless, it applied section 301 as the applicable distribution section in-
stead of the usual section 356.'" Babcock cited Davant, but applied the cus-
tomary section 356 after finding the (D) reorganization.
A bona fide sale will not amount to a liquidation-reincorporation. In
Allied Stores Corp.'1" the parent liquidated the subsidiary because of a debt
owed to the latter. The assets were then sold for cash at their fair market
value to another subsidiary. The Tax Court found no liquidation-reincorpora-
tion.
There is an obvious need for legislative clarification in this area. The situ-
ation arises any time a practitioner in good faith observes section 331 and
incorporates the assets again. No tax avoidance may have been intended.
In the final analysis the taxpayer is punished by the conjunctive use of Code
sections. A clear-cut policy of liquidation-reincorporation could be delineated
by defining the interval between liquidation and transfer to another corpora-
tion that should be observed to escape liquidation-reincorporation. A period
of six months would appear to be a reasonable interval. Any business assets
that are not actively put to use in this period of time would lose a substantial
portion of their value. A second matter capable of definition is the percentage
of assets necessary to be transferred before a liquidation-reincorporation at-
tack may be sustained. Presently the courts refuse to use any mathematical
test. The only standard is the transfer of "operating" assets-whatever that
may be. A transfer of a set percentage, or the lack of it, would give the
taxpayer firm grounds for planning his tax affairs.
V. INTERACTION OF THE (D) AND OTHER CODE SECTIONS
The (D) reorganization affects and is affected by other Code sections. In
particular, the following sections are analyzed because of their material in-
fluence on the tax aspects of (D) reorganizations. Some sections, notably
section 354 and the basis sections, are dealt with in other areas of this Arti-
cle.21'
1. Section 337. Closely related to the liquidation provisions of section 331 is
section 337. This provision allows the sale or exchange of properties without
gain or loss within a twelve-month period if accompanied by a complete liquid-
ation of assets. In the instance of a purchase of a subsidiary corporation the
basis in the assets becomes the same as the purchase price paid for the stock,
not the basis of the assets to the corporation.' The (D) interaction comes into
play when the assets obtained are transferred to an existing corporation or to
209 If INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 301 is utilized, there is full tax on any distribution.
Id. 5 356, however, recognizes that there is a basis for part of the distribution and taxes
only the excess-the "boot."
"1019 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1149 (1960).1
'See sections II(D) supra and V(9) infra.
22 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 334(b) (2). If there is a liquidation of the parent, id.
§ 334(a) gives fair market value as the basis in the hands of the distributee.
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a new entity formed for the purpose of receiving the section 337 assets. Ob-
viously if a reorganization is held to have taken place, the basis provision per-
taining to reorganization (section 362) must be used. The old basis of the
assets in the transferor corporation becomes the basis for the assets in the trans-
feree.
This precise situation arose in Griswold v. Commissioner.1' The taxpayers
attempted to come under section 337, but made the mistake of contractually
agreeing to keep the corporation viable, instead of liquidating it to obtain the
assets."4 The court made reference to Davant, Reef, and Babcock, and con-
cluded that a (D) and (F) reorganization had taken place."'
But a valid section 337 liquidation did take place in Rommer v. United
States... in connection with a plan of complete liquidation of the corporation.
Within twelve months after the adoption of the plan the corporation exchang-
ed a luxury apartment house for a low-rent tenement house and cash. The tene-
ment house and cash were distributed to the shareholders proportionately, but
five days later the tenement house was conveyed to a new corporation formed
for the purpose of receiving it. The Commissioner contended that a (D) re-
organization had been effected.
The trial court was convinced that not only had a valid section 337 liquida-
tion taken place, but that the (D) reorganization failed because of noncompli-
ance with section 354. The tenement house represented only nine percent of
the total value of the transferor's assets. This could not constitute a transfer of
"substantially all" the assets in compliance with section 354(b)(1) (A).
There even existed a valid business reason for putting the tenement house in a
corporation.""
The opinion would have been far more exciting reading if the court had not
found for the taxpayer on both major issues. If there had been both a valid
section 337 liquidation and compliance with section 354(b) (1) (A), what
result? The tenor of the opinion"' suggests that the emphasis on the validity of
a section 337 liquidation would leave the court no choice but to disregard the
contention of a subsequent reorganization. Moreover, the court would be at
perfect liberty to omit any findings of a step transaction leading to the (D)
reorganization.
Ordinarily if a section 337 liquidation is attempted and a (D) reorganiza-
tion is found instead, the taxpayer will have some relief because of the non-
recognition section of section 36 1 (a). But if a foreign corporation is involved,
section 367 requires that a ruling be obtained before the non-recognition pro-
vided in section 361 becomes applicable. Failure to do so will cause recognition
of gain on the exchange in spite of a valid (D) reorganization. 1"
213400 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1968).
"
4 A learned accountant had correctly advised them on compliance with S 337, but the
advice was not followed.
"' As far as any trend is concerned, it appears that courts are regarding it necessary for
some unknown reason to hold that not one but two reorganizations take place. Where a(D) is found, seemingly the (F) follows.
216268 F. Supp. 740 (D.N.J. 1966).
""The shareholders did not want to have their names associated with the property or
to incur any contingent personal liability from direct ownership.
218 Such as the unnecessary discussion by the court at 268 F. Supp. at 745.
" 1Werner Abegg, 50 T.C. 145 (1968), aff'd, 429 F.2d 1209 (2d Cit. 1970).
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2. Section 355. The very definition of the (D) reorganization relates to quali-
fication under section 355. The section does not exist merely as an accommo-
dation to the (D); rather it may operate regardless of whether a (D) reor-
ganization is in the making."2' The theory and purpose of section 355 is to set
the ground rules for the distribution of stock or securities of a controlled cor-
poration that the transferor has obtained to the latter's shareholders. The dis-
tribution may take one of three forms: spin-off, split-off, or split-up.
To "spin off" stock of the transferee the transferor distributes that stock to
its shareholders without requiring an exchange of any sort. The stock distribu-
ted need not be in proportion to the holdings in the transferor."' The "split-off"
is the same thing, except the shareholders exchange their stock in the transferor
for the newly distributed transferee-controlled corporation stock.2 A "split-up"
is the formation of two controlled corporations to which the assets of the trans-
feror are transferred. The stock of the two transferees is then distributed to the
shareholders of the transferor in exchange for their stock. In this latter situa-
tion, as well as in a spin-off, the transferor liquidates.24
(a) The Code Requirements. Section 355 also has its own built-in limita-
tions on the procedures to be followed. Subparagraph (B) of section 355-
(a) ( 1) proscribes transactions that are used principally as a device for the dis-
tribution of earnings and profits of either the transferor or transferee. This is
obviously a somewhat less than objective test, which causes the whole trans-
action to suffer unnecessary scrutiny. One of the purposes of the reform in re-
organizations in subchapter C of the 1954 Code was to bring about an element
of certainty. To subject the transaction to a subjective test of whether a trans-
action is a "device" leaves much to be desired from the corporate planner's
standpoint.
A second limitation subject to the same criticism is contained in clause (ii)
of section 355 (a) (1)(D). Any retention of stock by the distributing cor-
poration will be subject to the satisfaction of the Secretary or his delegate that
no plan existed having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of the
federal income tax. Some conceptual difficulties arise as to how federal income
taxes could be avoided. If the stock or securities are retained rather than dis-
tributed, the shareholders still retain the same relative book value of their
2 0 If the reorganization does not qualify under § 354 by a conveyance of "substantially
all" the assets and a liquidation of the transferor thereafter, it must qualify under 5 355, or
not at all. Section 356 is merely a "boot" section to tax the "extras" distributed that do not
otherwise qualify under §5 354 or 355.211 See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 355(a) (2) (C). This subsection is new in the 1954
Code. Under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b) (11), a reorganization must be effected.
The Senate Report accompanying the 1954 bill noted that now the formation of a holding
company is not necessary to effect a distribution if a corporation already held stock in a sub-
sidiary. This was necessary under the 1939 Code. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 267 (1954).2
'
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 355(a) (2) (A).22 Id. § 355 (a) (2) (B). Note the advantages here. Certain minority or dissenting
shareholders may be discontinued in the old corporation via this method, yet retain equity
interests in the corporate assets by the new shares in substantially the same value as before
the exchange. Similarly, a closely-held corporation may be split into two corporations for the
benefit of co-owners, each of whom may continue to operate his respective corporation in-
dependently of the other. This is apparently subchapter C's answer to subchapter K for the
splitting of a corporate business in the same manner as a partnership.
2"The transferor does not necessarily have to dissolve pursuant to the laws of the state
of incorporation, but it must rid itself of substntially all the assets.
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shares in the corporation. The nondistributing transferor has as an asset the
stock or securities of the transferee in place of its assets it has conveyed to the
transferee. Since the transaction has the recognition of tax postponed at all
levels, it seems tortuous to advance the theory that tax avoidance can occur.
A third limitation is contained in paragraph (3) of section 355 (a) to the
effect that the general rule will not apply if the principal amount of the securi-
ties received exceed the principal amount of the securities surrendered in con-
nection with the distribution, or if securities are received and none are surren-
dered. 5
Section 355 coverage begins where section 354 ends. Section 354 covers
complete (or almost complete) distributions of the transferor; anything less
than a substantial transfer must qualify under section 355."' Both sections re-
quire the transferor corporation to distribute the stock received from the trans-
feree to the shareholders.'"
A fourth limitation is contained in section 355 (b). There must be an active
conduct of a trade or business on the part of the distributing corporation and
the controlled corporation in which the stock is distributed. It is not necessary
that the split-off or spun-off corporation be engaged in the same business-just
the active conduct of a trade or business. Paragraph (2) under section 355 (b)
attempts to define even more conservatively what the restrictions on an active
conduct of a trade or business should be. The trade or business must have been
conducted for at least five years ending on the date of the distribution of the
stock of the controlled corporation."' Moreover, the control.. of the distribu-
ted corporation must not have been acquired within that five-year period by
another corporation;"0 but if it was, the transaction in which the control is ac-
quired must not have been one in which gain or loss was recognized in whole
or in part."
The Service initially took the position that one active business could not be
split. Two or more active businesses in a corporation were required for a section
355 division. Then, in 1960, Edmund P. Coady" caused the obsolescence of
a good many rulings that had denied division of one active business. In a well-
reasoned opinion by Judge Tietjens the Regulation section 1.355-1 (a) was
'25 It is basic that the word "securities" in this context is in reference to debt instru-
ments rather than equity participation, which is usually denominated "stocks."2 0See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 354(b) (1) (A), excepting (D) reorganizations in-
volving less than a transfer of "substantially all" the assets.
227 Under a transaction qualifying under § 355, the transferor may retain a slight amount
of the stock of the transferee, provided there is no plan to avoid taxes. INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 355(a) (1) (D) (ii).2281d. § 355(b) (2) (B).21 Id. § 355 (a) (1) (D) (ii) also refers to the (D)'s control section, id. § 368(c).
m Id. 355(b) (2) (D) (i).
2
31 Id. 5355(b) (2) (D) (ii). If the control was obtained in a § 351 transaction, clause(ii) is satisfied. No tax recognition occurs in that transaction, unless "other property or
money" is acquired (§ 351(b)), or the liabilities-in-excess-of-basis section is involved (§
357(c)).
23233 T.C. 771 (1960), afl'd by order in mem. decision, 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961).
The Tax Court opinion is also an excellent review of the complete workings of § 355. For
another overview of § 355, especially in connection with mergers, inter alia, see Morris,
Combining Divisive and Amalgamating Reorganizations-Section 355 Fails Again, 46
TEXAs L. REv. 315 (1968). The article gives an in-depth analysis of Curtis v. United
States, 336 F.2d 714 (6th Cit. 1964), and Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794(4th Cir. 1966).
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held invalid to the extent that it provided that a single business might not be
divided."3 It is, therefore, rather well-settled that a single business may now be-
come the subject matter of a divisive reorganization.
(b) The Rulings.
(1) Old or New Trade or Business? As previously mentioned, the busi-
ness to be spun off" must have been actively conducted for five years. A tricky
exception is found in Revenue Ruling 56-227." This ruling involved a (D)
reorganization in which the assets were transferred to a foreign corporation in
a spin-off. The Service admitted that section 367.6 was complied with, or at
least not avoided. The new corporation was formed for valid business reasons.
The transferor had been operating in the United States for the required time.
Nevertheless, the Service said that this was a new venture, in a new territory, in
a different country. The five-year rule was, therefore, not met because it con-
stituted a "new" venture. The ruling placed some reliance on the now invalid
Regulation section 1.355-1(a), but the disqualification seemed to be based on
the five-year rule.
A subsequent ruling in the same year came to an almost irreconcilably dif-
ferent conclusion. Revenue Ruling 56-344"' involved a business in existence
for five years which was being transferred to another state because of competi-
tion. A new corporation was formed to receive it in exchange for its shares. The
Service viewed the transfer as a transfer of an already existing five-year busi-
ness to a new location and not the formation of a new business. Therefore, sec-
tion 355 (b) (2) was met. But under Revenue Ruling 56-227 section 367 can-
not be used as a basis for denial of qualification under section 355. Compared
with Revenue Ruling 56-344 can it be said that there is a distinction between
the transfer of "assets"'38 and the transfer of a "business"? If so, the Service
is tampering with logic and is exalting form over substance.
(2) Rental Property. The Service has traditionally frowned upon the spin-
off of rental real estate to a controlled corporation, seldom finding an active
business. Rental property is usually considered an investment asset, and, there-
fore, passively classified pursuant to the authority of Regulation section 1.355-
1 (c). Yet a little activity generated in the management of this property can
change the Government's mind. For example, Revenue Ruling 56-355"* allow-
ed a section 355 spin-off in a (D) reorganization of a building owned by a
bank which occupied thirty-five percent of the space as a tenant and leased the
' Coady has been followed in the Fifth Circuit. United States v. W.W. Marett, 325
F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1963).
"4 Or split-off or split-up. For purposes of this Article, whenever "spin-off" is mentioned,
"split-off" and "split-up" should be understood to follow concurrently since the treatment is
substantially the same.
m 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 183.
236 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 367 requires that in the case of foreign corporations in-
volving exchanges under certain Code sections that the Secretary or his delegate be con-
vinced that the transaction was not in pursuance of a plan to avoid taxes principally. Oddly
enough, id. S 368 is not one of the enumerated sections.
231 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 195.
'2' Assets were the subject matter of transfer in Rev. Rul. 56-227, 1956-1 CuM. BULL.
183.239 The "business" was transferred in Rev. Rul. 56-344, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 195. But
does not a business essentially contain assets being put to use in a coordinated manner?
5401956-2 CuM. BULL. 210,
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balance to other tenants. The bank also owned farm land and other rental
properties. All were spun-off to a new corporation. The Service found nothing
to prevent the properties from being active businesses of the bank.
Similarly, an eight-story building was the subject of a transfer in a (D)
reorganization qualifying under section 355 in Revenue Ruling 58-164.1 Sixty
percent of the building had been leased to others five years before the trans-
action. Two years before the transaction one hundred percent was leased to out-
siders. The ruling is silent as to whether any active management, maintenance,
or other duties were required of the transferor. The Service deemed the rental
business of the old corporation an active business under section 355 (b) (1).
Under section 355 (a)( 1 ) the receipt of all the stock in exchange for a por-
tion of the shareholder's holdings (amounting to a non pro rata distribution)
would not preclude the application of that section.
A different result was reached in Revenue Ruling 56-266.' A grocery chain
produced and distributed bakery and creamery products. It also owned various
parcels of real estate, but had no outside tenants. The chain even charged itself
rentals for the real estate based on gross sales. In a (D) reorganization at-
tempting to qualify under section 355 the chain organized three new corpora-
tions, transferring to them the bakery business, creamery business, and the real
estate. The Service turned thumbs down on the real estate corporation, and tax-
ed the distribution of that stock to the shareholders under section 301. Citing
Regulation section 1.355-1 (c) as authority the Service reasoned that "the own-
ership of a grocery chain did not represent the operation of a trade or business
separate and apart from the grocery business."'  Fortunately, section 351 saved
further taxation of the grocery chain and new corporation. The transfer did
qualify for section 351 even though the shares distributed were taxed.
Investment assets may also be qualified under section 355 if they represent
an insignificant or inconsequential portion of the assets transferred in relation
to the total transferred. The Service took this position in Revenue Ruling 56-
557'4 wherein a bank, conducting an active real estate business, transferred that
business to a new corporation along with certain investment assets. The invest-
ment assets had no relation to the real estate business and represented only a
small portion of the total assets transferred. Because the amount transferred
was insubstantial in comparison with the total "active" assets transferred section
355 was not rendered inapplicable.
Real estate, therefore, must be "active" in order to qualify as a distribution
under section 355(b) in addition to satisfying the other rules of that section.
If tax planning permits, and there is a view toward distribution at a later date,
affirmative covenants and duties with respect to the operation, maintenance,
and servicing of otherwise passive real estate assets should be incurred by the
owners. This will lend an aura of activity to the business assets that may in-
crease the probability of a favorable Service decision.
3. Section 351. Section 351 is analogous to the (D) reorganization in that it
241 1958-1 CUM. BULL. 184.
24 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 184.
1 Id. at 185.
24 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 199.
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involves a transfer to a corporation controlled by the transferor. Unlike the
(D), the transferor may be plural, and consist of a partnership, individuals, a
corporation, or any combination. There is no requirement under section 351 for
a distribution of whatever is received in the transfer. Moreover, if there is a
distribution, section 301 will probably apply."
Section 351 also looks to the same control subsection, section 368(c). In-
deed, section 351 and the (D) reorganization are literally indistinguishable
during the initial phase involving the (D) transfer, since the requirements of
section 351 are also met. But if the (D) reorganization is qualified under sec-
tion 355, is section 351 necessarily inapplicable? Bear in mind that section 355
does not require a reorganization for qualification under it.
What appeared to be a (D) reorganization qualifying under section 355
was also held to be a section 351 transaction in Revenue Ruling 62-138.' * A
banking corporation owned all the outstanding stock of a realty corporation,
which in turn owned and operated several rental businesses. Two of the rental
businesses were transferred to a new corporation, which became a wholly own-
ed subsidiary of the realty corporation. The stock of the new subsidiary was
transferred to the realty corporation, which transferred it to the banking cor-
poration. The Service treated this as a section 351 transaction with a qualifying
distribution under section 355. Since the transaction involved corporations, and
an integrated plan was present, it is difficult to see how the transaction could
escape classification as a (D) transaction qualifying under section 355. The
successive distributions (from the realty corporation to its parent) would not
constitute a stumbling block since section 355 qualifies these, not subparagraph
(D).
If Revenue Ruling 62-138 seems inconsistent, then Revenue Ruling 58-
2184 ' is also consistently inconsistent. What appeared to be a section 351 trans-
action was denominated a (D) reorganization. An association of insurance
underwriters, having escrowed cash and other assets in a guaranty fund in ac-
cordance with state laws, desired to form a stock insurance company via the
corporate route. The assets, less the cash drawn down, were distributed to the
underwriters upon incorporation. It is perhaps pertinent to reveal that the as-
sociation was previously taxed as a corporation. Nevertheless, the Service (1)
treated the transaction as a reorganization within the meaning of section 368-
(a) (1),""' (2) taxed the receipt of their original cash as a dividend under
section 356(a) (2) to the extent of a ratable share of earnings and profits,'
and (3) allowed the earnings and profits of the association not affected by the
distribution to become the earnings and profits of the new corporation under
2 See note 247 infra, and accompanying text.
24 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 95.
247 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 185.
' The writer of the ruling did not complete the balance of the Code section so as to
advise the reader under which subsection the reorganization fell. Obviously, if it was a
transfer of assets in exchange for stock, it must be a (D).WTo the extent the cash exceeded each recipient's ratable share of earnings and profits
of the unincorporated association, the additional portion was taxed as a gain from the ex-
change of property. Naturally the basis of the stock received was increased under § 358(a)
by the dividend and gain recognized.
The writer has heretofore vocalized his position on the taxing of the return of capital
called "gain" in excess of the ratable share of earnings and profits. Here the cash returned
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section 381." ° The ruling gives no clue as to why the reorganization sections
were chosen for the caption of the transaction over section 351. Clearly section
351 is the proper vehicle through which an unincorporated association may
incorporate. Yet subsection (D) was utilized. Since the distribution of the cash
was given dividend treatment, section 301 could have worked in conjunction
with section 351 as easily as sections 368 and 356.
Section 351 can give relief where subsection (D) cannot. As mentioned,
an incomplete (D) reorganization is in essence a section 351 transaction; it
is the subsequent distribution that finds either safe harbor or taxation in other
sections of the Code. Some of the pre-Coady rulings would not qualify
a transaction under section 355 on the theory that there was really an attempt
to divide a single business."' If section 355 could not be satisfied, there could be
no (D) reorganization. But there can still be a section 351 transaction, and no
subsequent qualification is needed. The transfers at least will be tax free, even
if the distributions are not.
4. Section 381. Any reorganization will necessarily involve an interrelationship
with corporate tax provisions. Section 381 of the Code in certain instances al-
lows the carryover of the items listed in its subsection (c)... to the acquiring
corporation from the transferor corporation. The (D) reorganization receives
its honorable mention in section 381(a) (2), but the attributes are available
for carryovers only if the (D) reorganization qualifies under section 354(b)-
(1) (A) or (B)." A section 355 qualification will simply not suffice. One
corporation accomplished a split-up under section 355 (a) and attempted to use
a net operating loss carryover from a prior year in the two new corporations.
The Service denied the treatment by pointing to the definition in section
381 (a) (2).' Moreover, the legislative history indicated that section 381 was
not meant to apply to divisive reorganizations."
It is well to note for purposes of tax planning that (D) reorganizations
qualifying under section 354(a) (1) (A) or (B) will automatically pass the
earnings and profits of the transferor to the acquiring corporation.'
5. Section 356. Section 356 is the "boot" provision for the (D) reorganization
and covers the extras received in a reorganization that sections 354 and 355
do not cover by definition. It was principally designed to cover dividends in-
cident to a reorganization."' Yet it also comes in to tag the hapless shareholder
was clearly earmarked as a deposit in a guaranty fund. How could it conceivably represent
a ratable share of earnings and profits, especially in an unincorporated association (albeit
taxed as a corporation for federal tax purposes)?
"o The net effect of the carryover of earnings and profits is treated in section V (7) infra.
251 See note 232 supra.
252 See notes 232-35 supra, and accompanying text.
23 Twenty-three paragraphs of corporate tax attributes are listed in S 381 (c), each im-
posing its own limitations and qualifications for carryover.
'This paragraph also states that the transaction must also qualify under § 361. But it
seems redundant to acknowledge that a transaction is admittedly a (D), and also require
that it meet § 361 requirements. Section 361 presupposes the existence of a valid reorgani-
zation.
" Rev. Rul. 56-373, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 217.2
. See REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE ON H.R. 8300, S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954).257 See the holding in paragraph (6) of Rev. Rul. 58-218, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 185.2
"Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966).
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caught in a liquidation-reincorporation or in a sale to a commonly owned cor-
poration.
The recent Revenue Ruling 70-240... involved a sale of one corporation's
operating assets to another. One shareholder owned the stock of both corpora-
tions. The balance of the assets, mostly liquid, were distributed pursuant to sec-
tion 331 after the debts were paid. Even though the fair market value price
was paid for the assets, the Service claimed a (D) reorganization had taken
place instead of a sale. In such a situation the shareholder would be treated as
if he had received stock in the other corporation,"'0 and would be taxed on the
liquidating distribution under section 356(a) (2) as a dividend rather than at
capital gain rates under section 331.
The moral of this ruling is apparently that the concession of arm's length
dealing between two commonly owned corporations will not override the appli-
cation of liquidation-reincorporation and subsequent section 356 dividend treat-
ment. What could the owner of both corporations have done to avoid this re-
sult and still achieve the liquidation of one into the other? The answer may be
an oversimplification: transfer all assets, leaving none to go to the shareholder
for section 356 treatment. There is admittedly no tax, but the owner still has
the assets in corporate solution.
Section 356(a) (2) contains a built-in limitation on the amount of tax in
a distribution. The dividend to a distributee would be recognized only to the
extent "as is not in excess of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and
profits of the corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913.' ' "1 The issue
may be raised as to just which corporation is regarded as the distributing cor-
poration-the transferor or transferee? The transferor corporation usually
makes the distribution or liquidating dividend, and should be the logical candi-
date to examine for earnings and profits. If the distribution is clear-cut, the
transferor's earnings and profits are deemed to be the amount from which the
dividend is determined.' A contrary result was reached in Davant." The court
could not ascertain with any degree of precision from which corporation the
distribution came. Therefore, the undistributed earnings and profits of both
corporations served as a basis from which dividends were calculated.
The balance of section 356(a) (2) advises that the excess distribution over
and above the taxpayer's ratable share of earnings and profits is to be treated
"as gain from the exchange of property."
One approach clearly not available to a petitioner in the Tax Court is that of
showing the absence of the issuance of stock in connection with the transfer.
The courts seemingly regard the issuance of additional stock as a "meaningless
gesture" and do not interpret the statutes as requiring such a vain act.
6. Section 1551. Section 1551 will deny multiple surtax exemptions and the
accumulated earnings credit in the proper circumstances. It will apply to trans-
23 1970 INT. REv. BULL. No. 20, at 17.
... Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1961).
20 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 356(a) (2).
'
2 James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
"'See note 203 supra, and accompanying text.
2"James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295, 307 (1964). See also Commissioner v. Morgan,
288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), rev'g 33 T.C. 30, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1961).
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fers of property to other corporations, such as those that occur in a (D) reor-
ganization. It is clearly no consolation to be able to show a qualified (D) re-
organization and the concomitant transfer pursuant to a valid business purpose,
because section 1551 may still be involved if the Commissioner (or the court)
believes that the acquisition of the additional surtax exemption of accumulated
earnings credit was a "major purpose" of the transfer."
One of the examples in the Regulations indicates that a new corporation
receiving property from another corporation, both corporations having com-
mon owners, will fall within the proscription of the statute. " Nevertheless, the
axe does not fall automatically. Case law smiles favorably on the taxpayer if he
can show that transfers in a (D) reorganization were not made with a major
purpose of securing surtax exemptions."7
7. Section 312.
(a) Generally. Section 312 details all transactions that affect earnings and
profits. Fortunately section 312(i) allows an allocation of the earnings and
profits to the transferee corporation." Subsection (i) requires that the (D)
must qualify under section 355.' A (D) reorganization qualifying under sec-
tion 354 presumably is not eligible for section 312(i) allocation of earnings
and profits." '7
The Regulations define how the allocation is to be made."' If the transfer is
to a newly created corporation, the allocation of the earnings and profits shall
be made in proportion to the fair market value of the business or businesses
retained by the transferor and the business or businesses of the transferee."'
"'Treas. Reg. § 1.1551-1(h) (1954). The Regulations suggest that this burden may
be met by the taxpayer's showing that the obtention of the exemption or credit was not a
major factor in relationship to the other matters which prompted the transfer.2
"Treas. Reg. § 1.551-1(g) (4), example (1) (1954).
217 In Cronstroms Mfg. Inc., 36 T.C. 500 (1961), two new corporations were formed
for the purpose of receiving the assets of a common parent corporation. The two petitioner
corporations did their evidence homework well in view of the court's language, id. at 506:
"[T~he transfers to the petitioners were not made with a major purpose of securing surtax
exemptions. Petitioners have satisfied us that there were a host of purposes for these trans-
fers .... Not one of these purposes has the remotest connection with securing the surtax
exemption ......
268 The reason it is fortunate is because there are few circumstances wherein earnings
and profits leave a corporation without tax. Moreover, the accumulated earnings tax is that
much further away. But see notes 276-79 infra, and accompanying text.
269 Or, as the Code reads, "so much of section 356 as relates to section 355." INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 312(i).
270 Why not? If there is an allocation of the proportionate amounts of the earnings and
profits on the basis of the proportion of assets transferred to those retained, then why not
have the same allocation apply? See the discussion in section II(D) supra.
To ask is to answer it. The § 354(b) qualification for the (D) is that "substantially
all" the assets must be transferred. The amount of assets retained by the transferor upon
which the proportionate amount of earnings and profits would be calculated would be
de minimis. Moreover, Treas. Reg. § 1.312-11, T.D. 6476, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 114 appar-
ently controls so as to pass the earnings and profits through to the transferee.
271 Treas. Reg. S 1.3 12-10 (1954), entitled "Allocation of earnings in certain corporate
separations." Subsection (a) only is applicable.
I2 The aforecited Regulation also adds "and interests in any other properties." From a
nonpragmatic viewpoint, the Regulations seem to operate under the delusion that a newly
created corporation will somehow have several businesses and "other properties" from some
source other than the transferor. The newly created corporation is generally what it is thought
to be and no more: a receptacle for the transfer of the assets so that the stock or securities




The Regulations go further to state that the allocation should be made "in a
proper case"""5 between the transferor and transferee in proportion to the net
basis... of the assets transferred and of the assets retained. The transferee cor-
poration must also include the allocated earnings and profits of the transferor
in its computation of earnings and profits for the first taxable year ending after
the date of the transaction."
If there is merely a distribution or exchange to which section 355 alone ap-
plies, without a qualifying (D) reorganization, then subsection (b) of Regu-
lation section 1.312-10 applies. In such an instance the lesser of the net worth
of the controlled corporation, or the amount by which earnings and profits
would have been decreased if there had been a (D) reorganization, will be
applicable to the distributing corporation.
The interplay of subparagraph (D) and section 312 is illustrated by the re-
cent case of Bennet v. United States."'" The taxpayers had received a distribution
of stock and subsequent dividends in a (D) spin-off. Because they allocated
earnings and profits according to the proportionate net tax bases of the two
corporations after the reorganization, the taxpayers contended that a portion of
the dividend was a return of capital. Since the assets spun off had a higher fair
market value than tax basis, the Government naturally contended that the al-
location should be based on the values after the spin-off. The trial commission-
er announced that the objective of section 312 was to incorporate the rule
in Commissioner v. Sansome'T' to the effect that whatever were "earnings and
profits" of the original company remain, for purposes of a distribution, "earn-
ings and profits" of the successor. The trial commissioner further reasoned that
the application of this rule would dictate that no transferee could be allocated
profits and earnings in excess of its net worth, a conclusion which would effec-
tively neutralize the (D) reorganization with respect to future shareholder
taxability.
The Court of Claims declined to pass on the "net worth" limitation, but
reached an identical result by reference to Regulation section 1.312-10(a)." '
The Regulation does follow Sansome in principle, but allows some leeway for
the (D) reorganization: (1) for newly created corporations, to which earn-
ings and profits are allocated in proportion to the fair market value of the busi-
ness; and (2) in a "proper case" allocation is made on the net basis of assets
retained and those transferred. The Court of Claims noted that under the Regu-
lation the fair market value method is prima facie proper. In this instance the
taxpayer failed to show that this was a "proper case" for application of the net
basis method. This ruling keeps alive the well-established interpretation based
2 7 3 Treas. Reg. § 1.312-10(a) (1954). How does "in a proper case" differ from "in the
case of a newly created corporation?" In the latter instance, allocation is made on the basis
of the businesses; in the former on the basis of net assets. Since a business has some direct
correlation in size with its underlying assets, the distinction may be in words only.274 Treas. Reg. § 1.312-10(a) (1954). This Regulation defines "net basis" as the basis
of the assets less liabilities assumed, or liabilities to which assets are subject.
275Treas. Reg. § 1.312-10 (1954).
271 192 Ct. Cl. 448, 427 F.2d 1202 (1970).
27760 F.2d 1931 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 667 (1932).
278427 F.2d at 1213.
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on Sansome that section 312 is a proscription on the escape of shareholder tax-
ation on earnings and profits distributed after a divisive reorganization."
(b) Deficits. Subsection (c) of Regulation section 1.312-10 states that a
deficit of a distributing corporation within the meaning of section 355 may not
be allocated to a controlled corporation. In the instance of a spin-off or split-
off the transferor corporation must retain the deficit, no part of which may
inure to the transferee. But if there is a split-up, there is no transferor corpora-
tion in existence. The deficit is lost. 0 It is, therefore, advisable not to effect a
(D) reorganization split-up if the transferor has a deficit.
(c) Section 354 Qualification. Regulation section 1.312-11 deals with the
effect on earnings and profits of a (D) reorganization qualifying under section
354. Regulation section 1.312-10 deals only with corporate separations."' Reg-
ulation section 1.312-11 refers to section 381 for carryover effects of earnings
and profits and deficits thereto. Section 381 (c) (2) (A) advises that the earn-
ings and profits (or the deficit) shall be deemed to have been received by the
transferee on the closing date of the transfer. Section 381 (c) (2) (B) places
a limit on the usage of the deficit by the transferee. It may only be used to off-
set the earnings and profits of the transferee that are accumulated after the date
of the transfer. The accounting treatment given these deficits in earnings and
profits is set forth in great detail in the Regulations."s
8. Section 306. It is basic that a dividend of redeemable preferred stock falls
within section 306 and is accordingly entitled to ordinary income treatment
only by the recipient. It is very possible to receive section 306 stock in con-
nection with a (D) reorganization. Revenue Ruling 59-197' shows how this
is accomplished.
A (D) reorganization took place in connection with a section 355 split-off.
The shareholder in question surrendered all his stock in the old corporation for
common and preferred stock in the new one. The preferred was redeemable.
The par value and redemption price of the preferred received by the sharehold-
er was such that it was in proportion to his allocable share of earnings and
profits immediately held before the distribution and exchange. Under Regula-
tion section 1.306-3 (d) the preferred would be section 306 stock if he had re-
ceived cash instead. This, of course, would be a dividend.
9. Basis. To digress briefly, it has been seen that two Code sections control the
nonrecognition of the assets and stock exchanged in the (D) reorganization.
Section 354 protects the shareholders from recognition of tax, and section 361
protects the corporation. The tax rationale in an instance of nonrecognition is
to leave everything as it was beforehand, even the basis. If tax is to be deferred
271 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Phipps, 336 U.S. 410 (1949); Commissioner v. Munter,
331 U.S. 210 (1947).2S"Nesson, Earnings and Profits Discontinuities Under the 1954 Code, 77 HARv. L.
REv. 450, 489 (1964). See also Lyons, Some Problems in Corporate Separations Under the
1954 Code, 12 TAX L. REv. 15, 23 (1957).
281 The Regulations for some reason wish to draw a distinction in nomenclature between
a corporate separation and a corporate reorganization. Nevertheless, a (D) is a (D) whether
it qualifies under § 355 or § 354.2 8 Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c) (2)-1, T.D. 6692, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 150.
28 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 77.
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until a subsequent event, then no party increases or decreases his starting point,
or basis, in the transaction.
(a) To the Shareholder. As mentioned, the (D) reorganization must quali-
fy under sections 354, 355, or 356-the shareholder-distributee's special Code
sections. For basis, section 358 applies, inter alia, to exchanges to which sections
354, 355, or 356 apply. By a circuitous path section 358 arrives at the share-
holder's doorstep in a (D) reorganization.
The basic rule of section 358 is that the shareholder will attach to the prop-
erty received the same basis as that of the property surrendered-provided no
gain or loss is recognized on the exchange. ' If anything else is distributed,
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 358(a) (1) become applicable to the
basis. Subparagraph (A) decreases the basis in three instances: ( 1 ) by the fair
market value of any property received, (2) by the amount of money received,
and (3) by the amount of loss sustained by the shareholder on the exchange.
Conversely, subparagraph (B) may increase basis by: (1) the amount of
dividend received, and (2) the amount of gain other than from a dividend.
Subparagraph (2) under the general rule of section 358(a) states that any
other property received shall have as its basis the fair market value at the time
of its receipt. This tax effect is paraphrased in section 358(a) (1) (A) (i),
in that the overall basis of the shareholder will be reduced by the receipt of this
type of property.
Subsection (b) tells the shareholder how to allocate his basis. Initially he is
to allocate basis among all assets received without recognition of gain or loss.
If the shareholder receives several classes of stock and concurrently surrenders
several classes, whatever his combination, he is required by the Regulations to
allocate basis in proportion to the respective fair market values.' If he par-
ticipates in a section 355 distribution without surrendering any stock, basis
must then be allocated among all his properties, which means an allocation
among retained stock and that received.
Subsection (d) treats the assumption of a liability of the corporation as
money received by the corporation on the exchange."8 The Regulations reveal
that this situation arises most frequently in section 351 transfers in which a tax-
payer transfers encumbered property to a corporation and not in a corporate
reorganization.
It is permissible for the shareholder to average the basis to the stock and
securities received by the substitution required by section 358." 8 But if recog-
nizable gain or loss enters the picture, the problem changes. The shareholder
must compute separate gain or loss on the shares going out, i.e., exchanged. The
dilemma he faces is that the gain may not be offset by the loss, even if he owns
" Recall at this point that the prime if not only function of § 356 is to tax the gain
recognized on an exchange, a function that §§ 354 and 355 were not designed to accomplish.
285 Treas. Reg. § 1.356-2(a) (1954). Mathematical computations are given under para-
graph (b) of this Regulation to fit nearly any occasion.
286 The subsection in reference speaks literally of the "taxpayer," not the corporation. It
would not make much sense to equate the taxpayer with the shareholder for the interpreta-
tion here, since the shareholder would rarely have a liability or debt assumed by the trans-
feree corporation. It is his corporation, the transferor, that is transferring the property
(assets) to the transferee. And only the transferee can assume the liability.28 7Treas. Reg. § 1.358-3 (1954).
218 See B. B1TTKER & J. EusTIcE, supra note 70, § 12.34.
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two blocks of the stock of the same corporation purchased at separate inter-
vals."'9 The source of this unjust bit of law is, as so many other parts of taxation,
not grounded in logic but in application of another Code section. The boot
section, section 356 (c), unequivocally states that no gain or loss shall be recog-
nized from the exchange or distribution to which sections 354 or 355 apply.
The interpretation has been that the Commissioner can eat the fruit while the
taxpayer spits out the seed.""
(b) To the Transferor. Section 358 is also the Code basis section for the
corporate transferor. At first it may seem that section 362 is the applicable basis
section because of its heading "Basis to Corporations." It is excluded from the
(D) reorganization because subsection (a) relates only to section 351 trans-
fers or for paid-in surplus or contributions to capital. Subsection (b) is ex-
plicitly inapplicable if the property acquired in the transfer consists of stock or
securities,"9 ' which is just what the transferor gets for his asset transfer. Under
section 358 the transferor will take as its basis for the stock or securities re-
ceived the basis of the assets transferred. The rules outlined for the shareholders
apply to the transferor corporation, except for the greater emphasis necessary
on the assumption of liability under section 358(d).
Under section 358(d) the transferor is required to reduce his basis in the
stock or securities received by the amount of liabilities assumed by the trans-
feree on the assets transferred to the latter. There is one limitation. The trans-
feror cannot reduce basis below zero in the stock or securities received because
of the assumption of liabilities. Negative bases do not presently exist in the tax
law, although serious discussion is afoot that questions the logic of that exclu-
sion.292
If the total liabilities assumed plus the total liabilities to which the properties
are subject exceed the adjusted basis of the transferor, gain will be recognized
by the transferor in the amount of the excess by application of section 357 (c).
Subparagraph (B) of section 357(c) (1) is pointed directly at the (D) re-
organization, calling it by name. Paragraph (2) goes on to say that paragraph
(1) will not apply in instances in which the principal purpose is the avoidance
of federal income tax on the exchange, or no bona fide business purpose is
present."' In either of these instances the tax liability is on the total liability
assumed or taken subject to by the transferee rather than the excess liability
assumed.' The difference is material if the taxpayer cannot sustain the burden
of proof."'
It is difficult to reconcile full taxation on the liabilities transferred under
29 See the result to the taxpayer in Rev. Rul. 68-23, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 144.
2
"1See Curtis v. United States, 336 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1964), taxing the gain but deny-
ing any offsetting loss from the same transaction.
291 The subsection goes on to say that if a (B) reorganization is in the making, it will
apply, and basis of the property acquired is the same as that of the transferor.
292See the court's extended treatment in Easson v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 653 (9th
Cir. 1961).
293 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 357(b) (1) (A), (B). As a practical matter it is almost
redundant for the Code to state that a bona fide business purpose must be present in light
of the infusion into all walks of tax life of the Gregory doctrine.2 9INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 5 357(b) (1) (B).




section 357(c) (2) with the theme of reorganizations in general. Section 368
in essence defines the reorganizations that escape taxation. If there is compli-
ance with section 368, there is a reorganization which is not a change in sub-
stance to the extent that it should be taxed. If this result is sound, why should
there be a tax because of section 357(c) (2)? Qualification under section
368 indicates that there is no event for taxation on the exchange. A better rule
would call for either no taxation or full taxation. Qualification of a reorgani-
zation under any subparagraph of section 368 (a) (1) should necessarily be dis-
positive of the tax consequences of that transaction, rather than the result being
contingent upon qualification under several other Code sections that may or
may not be related to the exchange."'
VI. CONCLUSION
One of the gratifying rewards of tax planning lies in the manipulation of
Code requirements to effectuate a given purpose. On its surface the field of cor-
porate reorganization posits an opportunity for such a task. Fulfillment of the
steps necessary for qualification should seemingly grant the end result sought.
But all too often this does not occur. How can assurance in the reorganization
sought be achieved with some predictability of the outcome?
The answer, of course, is the same as that suggested by most law commenta-
tors. There is a need, it is said in nearly all controversial fields of law, for clari-
fication by further legislation to eliminate the confusion and irreconcilability of
the court decisions. Yet as soon as the legislation is suggested, passed, and im-
plemented, problems of interpretation arise all over again and some persever-
ing taxpayer must again pioneer another legal doctrine and immortalize himself
by titling a court decision for posterity." '
But if court decisions cannot unravel the ambiguities, legislation must be
the only answer. The definitional field is a good place to begin. Take control
as an example. This is defined in section 368 (c) with a fair amount of mathe-
matical exactness, if that solves anything. Yet our case law interpretation of
control after the (D) reorganization concerns itself very little with the arith-
metic. Just how long the taxpayer held it and what were his subjective inten-
tions appear to be the principle issues in a section 368(c) determination. But
a literal reading of the Code and Regulations would not even reveal that this
was a problem.
The holding period for control could be simplified by picking an arbitrary
time period for which it must be maintained. A period of four months would
test the management of the new holders of the transferee's stock. Concrete
commitments for disposal of control after this time period should be allowed.
The law must concede a time period, the expiration of which allows a man to
plan his affairs with some element of certainty.!98
2"By reference to the table of contents of this Article one may obtain an idea of the
number of other Code sections involved in reorganizations.
287 Mrs. Gregory is known to all tax enthusiasts from Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935).
298 Analogous, of course, is the doctrine of the Statute of Limitations. Beyond this
varying period (from state to state) a litigant can have some assurance that he cannot be
sued, and vice versa.
[Vol. 25
THE (D) REORGANIZATION
The definition of "substantially all" in the section 354(b) (1) (A) qualifi-
cation section for the (D) reorganization has been troublesome. Interpretation
has centered on what constitutes essential or operating assets. Why not adopt
a percentage of gross or net assets, as the Service has attempted to do by rul-
ings? A Code sanction would remove these doubts.
The involuntary (D) reorganization, the liquidation-reincorporation, cer-
tainly poses a frightening nightmare to an unsuspecting taxpayer. Any later
disposition of liquidated assets will be subject to the attack if a corporate vehicle
is employed. But certainty could be gained by legislating a period of at least
six months as a time period in which the assets received may not be utilized in
further corporate solution, under penalty of invoking the reincorporation
doctrine. Moreover, the ultimate benefit to be gained by reincorporation would
be largely denied the taxpayer if such were his intentions, since restraint from
future operations in corporate form would negate the utility of the operating
assets. The loss of the essential assets for any ongoing business for such a time
period would cause material deleterious effects on that business. The counter-
balancing advantage to the taxpayer is that he knows with certainty what he
may do after the expiration of the time period. 9'
Space does not permit a tirade into the faults of section 355. The section may
stand on its own, and is not absolutely necessary for (D) qualification since
section 354 is still available. Section 355 has been thoroughly documented by
worthwhile criticism that should produce constructive revision at the next legis-
lative opportunity."'0
The interrelationship of section 351 and the (D) reorganization could stand
further definition. It is not enough to remark that a partially completed (D)
reorganization is in reality a section 351 transaction without the distribution.
Section 351 could be positioned in the reorganization definitions as another
form of corporate reorganization. It may well be that now, but it is not so label-
led. If it were given the subparagraph designation that (A) through (F) now
enjoy, one result would be to destroy the mandatory distribution requirement of
sections 354 and 355. Even now, of course, no distribution is required under
section 351.
The trend of the (D) reorganization is far from clear. There appears to be
no movement toward liberal interpretation of its usage. By the same token,
disqualification is not automatic if the courts and the Service are convinced of
the innocuousness of the transaction. As an afterthought, or maybe a wish, per-
haps another Supreme Court interpretation of subparagraph (D) will elimi-
nate some of the present inconsistencies. 0'
2" And conversely, he knows for sure what he cannot do with the liquidated assets during
the proscribed time period.
K See, e.g., Morris, Combining Divisive and Amalgamating Reorganizations--Section
355 Fails Again, 46 TEXAs L. REv. 315 (1968).
"01 When the word "another" is used, reference is implicitly made to the first rather
famous (D) reorganization, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), which did not
embark on a substantive interpretation of the (D) mechanics.
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